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ARTICLES
FINANCIERS AS MONITORS IN
AGGREGATE LITIGATION
ELIZABETH CHAMBLEE BURCH*
This Article identifies a market-based solution for monitoring large-scale litigation
proceeding outside of Rule 23’s safeguards. Although class actions dominate the
scholarly discussion of mass litigation, the ever increasing restrictions on certifying
a class mean that plaintiffs’ lawyers routinely rely on aggregate, multidistrict litigation to seek redress for group-wide harms. Despite sharing key features with its
class action counterpart—such as attenuated attorney-client relationships, attorneyclient conflicts of interest, and high agency costs—no monitor exists in aggregate
litigation. Informal group litigation not only lacks Rule 23’s judicial protections
against attorney overreaching and self-dealing, but plaintiff’s themselves cannot
adequately supervise their attorneys’ behavior. Plaintiffs’ attorneys may represent
thousands of geographically dispersed clients, which fosters collective-action
problems and makes individual, case-specific information hard to obtain.
An answer to this monitoring problem comes from an unlikely and potentially
controversial source: alternative litigation financing. Self-dealing and high agency
costs arise in aggregate litigation principally because of the contingent-fee attorney’s
dual roles as agent and investor. These roles can pull lawyers in divergent directions; because attorneys front massive litigation costs, they may be tempted to
coerce clients into settling so that they can recoup and profit from their investment.
Third-party litigation financing, which involves hedge funds, private investors, and
venture capitalists investing in and profiting from large-scale litigation, can ameliorate this critical conflict of interest by allowing the financier to bear the financial
risk. Shorn of financial self-interest, the lawyer is then free to act as a faithful agent.
Although alternative litigation financing can be controversial, this Article seeks to
marry profit-seeking capitalists and aggregate litigation in a way that benefits
society as a whole and plaintiffs in particular.
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INTRODUCTION
Efforts aimed at extinguishing the class action have metastasized
over the past fifteen years, culminating most recently in the Supreme
Court’s Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes opinion.1 Without class certification, aggregate litigation offers all of the perils and few of the
1 See 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2550–52 (2011) (strengthening the commonality requirement for
class actions); see also Elizabeth Chamblee Burch, The New Dawn of Nonclass
Aggregation, SCOTUSBLOG (Apr. 6, 2012), http://www.scotusblog.com/2011/09/the-newdawn-of-nonclass-aggregation/ (“Consider, for example, the changes wrought over the past
fifteen years by the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act, the Securities Litigation
Uniform Standards Act, Amchem Products, Inc. v. Windsor, Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp.,
and the Class Action Fairness Act, to name but a few.”).
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promises of the class action.2 Granted, the class action posed problems
too,3 but without its help in providing closure and the judge’s role in
ensuring a fair settlement, lawyers have dreamed up new means for
achieving closure that evoke class-action nostalgia. For example,
attorneys have exploited the attorney-client relationship by coercing
clients into accepting a settlement, threatening to withdraw from representing nonconsenting clients, paying off holdouts to fulfill defendants’ demands for complete resolution, forging ongoing “sweetheart”
business relationships with settling defendants, and overcompensating
weak but prevalent claims to attract more clients.4
The problem, in part, is that plaintiffs’ attorneys play two, often
conflicting roles: They serve as both financiers and agents. These dual
roles can pull attorneys in divergent directions. Just as in class actions,
lawyers front the costs of litigating massive cases. But these cases are
even more expensive than class actions. Attorneys must spend time
advertising and recruiting clients. Then, they must track each case,
hire paralegals to handle the added paperwork, establish specific causation, and spend time persuading each client to settle. Add to that
the cost of expert witnesses, investigation, document review, and coordinating with other multidistrict litigation attorneys, and the expenses
could easily bankrupt a small firm. So when a defendant puts money
on the table—even money with many strings attached—it tempts
2 “Aggregate litigation” is an umbrella term used when cases are handled jointly,
whether solely for pretrial purposes through multidistrict litigation or formally joined
through Rule 20 or consolidated through Rule 42. FED. R. CIV. P. 20, 42. “Multidistrict
litigation” is a term used for cases that are brought individually, but transferred to a single
judge for pretrial handling under the multidistrict litigation statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1407.
Though the transfer is technically for pretrial purposes only, these cases rarely return to
their original districts. See DeLaventura v. Columbia Acorn Trust, 417 F. Supp. 2d 147,
150-52 (D. Mass. 2006) (“[I]t is almost a point of honor among transferee judges acting
pursuant to Section 1407(a) that cases so transferred shall be settled rather than sent back
to their home courts for trial.”).
3 Agency problems in class actions have been frequently discussed. See, e.g., John C.
Coffee, Jr., The Regulation of Entrepreneurial Litigation: Balancing Fairness and Efficiency
in the Large Class Action, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 877, 882–84 (1987); Jonathan R. Macey &
Geoffrey P. Miller, The Plaintiffs’ Attorney’s Role in Class Action and Derivative
Litigation: Economic Analysis and Recommendations for Reform, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 1,
7–8 (1991).
4 See, e.g., Johnson v. Nextel Commc’n, Inc., 660 F.3d 131, 139–40 (2d Cir. 2011)
(describing an informal settlement guaranteeing plaintiffs’ counsel $2 million to work
directly for the defendant as a consultant); see also Howard M. Erichson & Benjamin C.
Zipursky, Consent Versus Closure, 96 CORNELL L. REV. 265, 267-68 (2011) (describing
how the Vioxx settlement required participating lawyers to withdraw from clients who
refused the settlement agreement); Bruce Hay & David Rosenberg, “Sweetheart” and
“Blackmail” Settlements in Class Actions: Reality and Remedy, 75 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
1377, 1390-91 (2000) (describing sweetheart settlements as agreements where the class
counsel receives disproportionately large fees due to overlapping party incentives); infra
Part I.B (detailing attorney-client agency problems).
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plaintiffs’ attorneys to strong-arm their clients into settling. The attorneys can then recoup and profit from their financial investment.
Because a client’s and a lawyer’s interests never overlap perfectly, the
lawyer’s monetary self-interest and duty of client loyalty may be at
odds with one another and lead to a settlement that is not necessarily
in the client’s best interest.5
Despite these problems, nonclass aggregation lacks a monitor to
police these settlements the way a judge polices class actions.
Although some judges have likened large multidistrict litigations to
class actions and have tried to oversee them accordingly,6 the existence of a legal basis for policing a “voluntary” settlement between
private parties is uncertain at best. Plus, the clients themselves are
unlikely to monitor their attorney: The very aggregation that increases
the economic viability of their claims fosters collective-action
problems and makes it difficult to obtain meaningful information from
their attorney.7 When cases are interdependent, learning the progress
of one’s own case may yield little information about the overall litigation and vice versa. Plus, individual plaintiffs tend to be unsophisticated about legal matters and to trust their attorney’s advice—that is,
after all, why they hired her.8
But the potential for a private monitor does exist in the unlikely
guise of third-party financiers—hedge funds, private investors, and
venture capitalists. Alternative litigation financing has gradually made
its way from Australia and the United Kingdom into the United
States, causing substantial controversy in the process. For example,
the New York Times has run a critical series of articles titled Betting
5 See Geoffrey P. Miller, Some Agency Problems in Settlement, 16 J. LEGAL STUD. 189,
190 (1987) (explaining the conflicts of interest that may arise between attorneys and their
clients).
6 For a discussion of cases in which judges have invoked their inherent authority to
reduce fee awards in nonclass aggregate litigation, see infra notes 109–10 and accompanying text.
7 See JACK B. WEINSTEIN, INDIVIDUAL JUSTICE IN MASS TORT LITIGATION 11–12
(1995) (explaining the extenuated attorney-client relationship in mass torts); Deborah R.
Hensler, As Time Goes By: Asbestos Litigation After Amchem and Ortiz, 80 TEX. L. REV.
1899, 1913 (2002) (noting the nontraditional attorney-client relationship in mass torts);
Charles Silver, Ethics and Innovation, 79 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 754, 756 (2011) (explaining
the extenuated attorney-client relationship in mass torts).
8 See Robert W. Gordon, The Independence of Lawyers, 68 B.U. L. REV. 1, 30 (1988)
(observing that lawyers cannot help but influence their clients); Samuel Issacharoff &
Daniel R. Ortiz, Governing Through Intermediaries, 85 VA. L. REV. 1627, 1639 (1999)
(noting that monitoring may require specialized knowledge that average individuals do not
possess); Russell Korobkin & Chris Guthrie, Psychology, Economics, and Settlement: A
New Look at the Role of the Lawyer, 76 TEX. L. REV. 77, 82 (1997) [hereinafter Korobkin
& Guthrie, Psychology] (observing that clients generally follow their attorney’s advice).
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on Justice,9 the American Bar Association has convened a
Commission on Ethics 20/20 Working Group on Alternative
Litigation Financing,10 and the United States Chamber of Commerce
recently issued a report titled Selling Lawsuits, Buying Trouble.11
Critics contend that alternative financing increases the number of lawsuits, particularly frivolous suits, and, in the aggregate litigation context, blackmails defendants into settling lawsuits regardless of the
merits.12
Despite this controversy, allowing third parties to fund nonclass
aggregation helps to manage principal-agent problems by freeing
attorneys from their financial self-interest and encouraging them to
act as faithful agents. It does so by (1) unbundling the attorney’s competing roles as investor and advisor, (2) shifting financial risk to a
third party who pays the attorneys on a billable-hour basis (plus perhaps some small percentage of the recovery as a bonus), and (3) putting in place a sizeable stakeholder with the sophistication and
incentive to monitor the agents. If plaintiffs assigned a financier a portion of the litigation’s proceeds (as the contingent fee does now) in
exchange for financing the lawsuit on a nonrecourse basis, the financier would become a super stakeholder.
Incentivizing a super stakeholder to monitor attorneys was the
basic premise behind Elliott Weiss and John Beckerman’s article, Let
the Money Do the Monitoring: How Institutional Investors Can Reduce
Agency Costs in Securities Class Actions.13 Weiss and Beckerman suggested that sophisticated institutional investors with the most at
stake—and thus the greatest incentive to monitor class attorneys—
9 E.g., Binyamin Appelbaum, Betting on Justice: Putting Money on Lawsuits, Investors
Share in the Payouts, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 15, 2010, at A1 [hereinafter Appelbaum, Betting on
Justice]; Binyamin Appelbaum, Lawsuit Loans Add New Risk for the Injured, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 17, 2011, at A1 [hereinafter Appelbaum, Lawsuit Loans]; Binyamin Appelbaum,
Lobby Battle over Loans for Lawsuits, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 10, 2011, at B1; Binyamin
Appelbaum, Taking Sides in a Divorce, Chasing Profit, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 5, 2010, at A1; see
also Ashby Jones, The Next National Investment Craze: Lawsuits!, WALL ST. J. BLOG (June
4, 2010, 12:36 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/law/2010/06/04/the-next-national-investment-crazelawsuits/.
10 ABA Comm’n on Ethics 20/20, For Comment: Issues Paper Concerning Lawyer’s
Involvement in Alternative Litigation Financing (Nov. 23, 2010), available at http://
www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/ethics2020/alfposting.authcheckdam.pdf.
11 U.S. CHAMBER INST. FOR LEGAL REFORM, SELLING LAWSUITS, BUYING TROUBLE:
THIRD-PARTY LITIGATION FUNDING IN THE UNITED STATES (2009).
12 Id. at 4–5.
13 Elliott J. Weiss & John S. Beckerman, Let the Money Do the Monitoring: How
Institutional Investors Can Reduce Agency Costs in Securities Class Actions, 104 YALE L.J.
2053 (1995). Their work led Congress to enact the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act
of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737 (codified in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.). S.
REP. NO. 104-98, at 11 n.32 (1995), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 679, 690.
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should serve as lead plaintiffs in securities class actions. Like institutional investors, financiers possess the legal acumen and financial
impetus to act as intermediaries by negotiating better hourly rates and
requiring attorneys to keep their costs reasonable. But unlike Weiss
and Beckerman, I propose paying plaintiffs’ attorneys on a billablehour basis to change their financial motivations; if a financier pushed
for a quick settlement, the attorney’s self-interest would counterbalance the financier’s. The billable hour encourages the lawyer to prolong litigation and spend time advising her clients about the risks of
litigating versus settling. Plus, it alleviates the concern over financial
risk that may prompt attorneys to pressure their clients to settle.
Third-party financiers have already started funding aggregate litigation: Napoli Bern made headlines when it borrowed roughly $35
million from Counsel Financial to fund the Ground Zero workers’
personal injury cases against the City of New York and then tried to
pass $6.1 million in interest costs on to the workers.14 Burford Capital
is currently funding thousands of Ecuadorian plaintiffs in their controversial personal injury battle against Chevron.15 Likewise, in a toxic
tort case against BNSF Railway, attorney Jared Woodfill borrowed
more than $3.5 million from a hedge fund to help finance litigation on
behalf of some 400 workers with skin and gastrointestinal cancers
allegedly caused by chemicals used to make railroad ties.16 These
financing arrangements, however, do not follow this Article’s
blueprint. Lending money to plaintiffs’ law firms on a recourse basis,17
as was the case for Napoli Bern and Jared Woodfill, may either intensify the pressure on plaintiffs to settle or present them with unexpected interest charges. As this suggests, the way in which financiers
bankroll aggregate litigation is critical; this new relationship raises a
panoply of questions about maintenance, champerty, barratry, confidentiality, privileges, consent, decision-making authority, and incen14 Appelbaum, Betting on Justice, supra note 9; Joseph Goldstein & Susan Edelman,
Assembly Speaker Sheldon Silver’s Firm Gets Cut of 9/11-Suit Payouts, N.Y. POST (Aug. 22,
2010), http://www.nypost.com/p/news/local/ill_heroes_must_shel_out_e1IBrP6PHVgTIR
O7saJ3kM.
15 Lawrence Hurley, ‘Master of Disaster’ Dons New Guise as Plaintiffs’ Attorney in
Pollution Case, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 1, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/gwire/2011/02/01/
01greenwire-master-of-disaster-dons-new-guise-as-plaintiff-74496.html?pagewanted=all;
Roger Parloff, Have You Got a Piece of This Lawsuit?, CNN MONEY (June 28, 2011), http:/
/features.blogs.fortune.cnn.com/2011/06/28/have-you-got-a-piece-of-this-lawsuit-2/. There
is an ironic link between the two cases: James Tyrrell, the plaintiffs’ lawyer in the case
against Chevron, defended New York City and contractors against 9/11 first responders’
claims. See Hurley, supra.
16 Appelbaum, Betting on Justice, supra note 9.
17 When a lendor loans money on a recourse basis, the debtor must repay the loan
regardless of whether the debtor wins or loses the lawsuit.
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tives. While scholars such as Richard Epstein, Keith Hylton, Jonathan
Molot, Anthony Sebok, and Paul Rubin have written about the economic and ethical implications of third-party financing,18 neither economists, ethicists, nor complex litigation scholars have considered
financing as a means for addressing the distorted lawyer-client relationship in mass litigation.
This Article focuses on the unique dynamics of funding mass litigation that proceeds outside of a class action and explains how uniting
aggregate litigation with third-party financing can reduce agency
costs.19 Part I.A first highlights the growing prevalence of nonclass
aggregation, identifies how it affects plaintiffs’ attorneys’ risks and
financial calculations, and notes its potential impact on substantive
enforcement goals. Part I.B then chronicles the ways in which attorneys may act contrary to their principals’ interests, through shirking or
self-dealing. The circumstances of mass litigation exacerbate these
unethical tendencies. Defendants continue to demand finality in
exchange for settling, but plaintiffs’ counsels’ efforts to provide that
finality and recover their financial investment outside the well-defined
class-certification path can drive them to push the limits of professional responsibility. Despite these ethically questionable practices,
there is little meaningful supervision over these settlements. Thus,
Part I draws the link between contingent-fee financing, the incentives
it creates for unethical behavior, and the lack of a supervising monitor
in nonclass aggregate litigation.
Part II provides the relevant background on alternative litigation
financing. It surveys the rise in third-party funding, demystifies the
18 See Jonathan T. Molot, Litigation Finance: A Market Solution to a Procedural
Problem, 99 GEO. L.J. 65 (2010) (contending that third party financing may promote accuracy in adjudication and settlement); Anthony J. Sebok, The Inauthentic Claim, 64 VAND.
L. REV. 61, 104-05 (2011) (arguing that historical doctrines like assignment and maintenance are not and should not be barriers to developing third-party litigation); Keith N.
Hylton, The Economics of Third-Party Financed Litigation 27 (Aug. 2011) (unpublished
manuscript), available at http://www.masonlec.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/07/HyltonRevised-Draft1.pdf (suggesting conditions under which third-party financing can enhance
and reduce social welfare); Richard A. Epstein, The Costly Freedom To Sue, N.Y. TIMES
(Mar. 3, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2010/11/15/investing-in-someoneelses-lawsuit/the-costly-freedom-to-sue (questioning whether litigation financing will pressure defendants to settle on disadvantageous terms because of an inability to finance their
defense); Paul H. Rubin, More Money into Bad Suits, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 16, 2010), http://
www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2010/11/15/investing-in-someone-elses-lawsuit/moremoney-into-bad-suits (claiming that litigation in the United States is already excessive and
that third-party financing will increase the number of lawsuits).
19 Because class actions include absent class members, they raise special concerns about
notice and consent. This Article likewise does not address aggregate litigation in bankruptcy proceedings, such as asbestos, which raise similar concerns.
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various funding types,20 and unpacks the myriad of incentives that animate diverse financiers, plaintiffs, and their attorneys. Part II anticipates Part III.A, which explores the potential benefits of disentangling
the attorney’s role as case-financier from her obligations as a loyal
advisor. Parts III.B and III.C, respectively, contemplate how to best
allocate decision-making control and how to structure the litigationfinancing agreement. As evidenced by the Ground Zero and BNSF
Railway litigations, nonconventional lenders can ensure continued
access to justice for cases that are uneconomical to pursue individually. If these transactions are structured according to this Article’s
blueprint, they might likewise supply the oversight and attorney monitoring that nonclass aggregation lacks.
Allowing financiers to act as intermediaries that counterbalance
agency problems requires some amendments to the existing regulatory
landscape. Accordingly, Part III.D introduces three categories of regulatory changes to accompany this market-based solution: (1) administrative-regulatory solutions, (2) judicial forms of oversight, and (3)
professional ethics constraints. First, administrative-regulatory solutions include extending the attorney-client privilege to cover financiers through the common interest doctrine, disclosing potential
conflicts of interest between financiers and attorneys to clients, and
substantively barring instruments that impose negative externalities
on plaintiffs. Second, judicial oversight entails submitting the
financing arrangement to the judge in camera to discourage unconscionable financing terms, excessive fee arrangements, and collusion
between financiers and attorneys. Finally, augmenting professional
ethics constraints involves relaxing historical bans on champerty, clarifying conflict-of-interest requirements for attorneys that seek out
third-party financing, and loosening confidentiality protections to
allow financiers to receive case-specific information.
As these changes suggest, third-party financing can introduce
risks, too. These intermediaries add a new wrinkle that cures some
principal-agent problems, but introduces others. Although financiers
will have an incentive to monitor the attorneys, their incentives may
not perfectly align with plaintiffs’ interests. For instance, litigation that
promotes social change by requesting injunctive and declaratory
relief, as often occurs in Title VII and civil rights cases, may well be
unattractive to investors who seek to maximize their returns. Part
III.E considers these challenges and weighs these tradeoffs, but ultimately concludes that introducing third-party financing to aggregate
20 Such differences include those between consumer legal funding, loaning money to
plaintiffs’ law firms, and financing business versus business disputes.
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litigation can improve the status quo by closing the existing funding
gap and by providing a much-needed monitor.
I
THE PREVALENCE AND COSTS
AGGREGATE LITIGATION

OF

Over the last fifteen years, the class-action landscape has shifted
steadily. Since the mid-1990s, both Congress and the judiciary have
curtailed class actions by providing federal courts with jurisdiction,21
requiring plaintiffs to prove Rule 23’s prerequisites by a preponderance of the evidence,22 and making class certification more rigorous
through a willingness to delve into the merits when they overlap with
the certification requirements.23 Most recently, Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.
v. Dukes strengthened the commonality standard under Rule 23(a)
and ensured that defendants can raise individual defenses, which
could inject individual issues into a class that might otherwise meet
Rule 23(b)(3)’s predominance requirement.24 These changes have
made certifying a class increasingly difficult. Consequently, an
21 The Class Action Fairness Act (CAFA), initially introduced in 1998 and in some
form every year thereafter until it was passed in 2005, provides federal court jurisdiction
over class actions by allowing defendants to remove a putative class worth $5 million in the
aggregate that has minimal diversity between the plaintiffs and the defendants. Class
Action Fairness Act of 2005 § 2(a), (b), Pub. L. No. 109-2, 119 Stat. 4, 5 (codified in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.).
22 See, e.g., In re Hydrogen Peroxide Antitrust Litig., 552 F.3d 305, 307 (3d Cir. 2008)
(allowing certification only if the plaintiffs establish Rule 23’s requirements by a preponderance of the evidence); Oscar Private Equity Invs. v. Allegiance Telecom, Inc., 487 F.3d
261, 269 (5th Cir. 2007) (applying the preponderance of the evidence standard); In re
Initial Pub. Offerings Sec. Litig., 471 F.3d 24, 41 (2d Cir. 2006) (holding that a court may
certify a class only after it “resolves factual disputes relevant to each Rule 23 requirement”); Szabo v. Bridgeport Machs., Inc., 249 F.3d 672, 676 (7th Cir. 2001) (“Before
deciding whether to allow a case to proceed as a class action, therefore, a judge should
make whatever factual and legal inquiries are necessary under Rule 23.”).
23 E.g., Hydrogen Peroxide Antitrust Litig., 552 F.3d at 307; Oscar, 487 F.3d at 268;
Initial Pub. Offerings Sec. Litig., 471 F.3d at 41; Szabo, 249 F.3d at 676; see also PRINCIPLES
OF THE LAW OF AGGREGATE LITIGATION § 2.06 (2011) (stating that questions of fact relevant to the suitability of class-action treatment should be resolved by the preponderanceof-the-evidence standard).
24 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2559–61 (2011). As Justice Scalia explained, under Title VII, “if the
employer can show that it took an adverse employment action against an employee for any
reason other than discrimination”—for instance, tardiness, poor customer service, false
information on an application, or insubordination—“the court cannot order the ‘hiring,
reinstatement, or promotion of an individual as an employee, or the payment to him of any
backpay.’” Id. at 2560–61. For previous cases noting that class certification could be proper
despite the availability of individual affirmative defenses, see Smilow v. Sw. Bell Mobile
Sys., Inc., 323 F.3d 32, 39–40 (1st Cir. 2003); Dupler v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 249 F.R.D.
29, 45-46 (E.D.N.Y. 2008); Aliotta v. Gruenberg, 237 F.R.D. 4, 12 (D.D.C. 2006). As for
commonality, what matters now is not whether plaintiffs can raise common questions, but
whether “a classwide proceeding [can] generate common answers apt to drive the resolu-

\\jciprod01\productn\N\NYU\87-5\NYU502.txt

1282

unknown

Seq: 10

NEW YORK UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

23-OCT-12

14:02

[Vol. 87:1273

increasing number of would-be classes now proceed en masse through
multidistrict litigation and liberal joinder devices, such as Rules 20 and
42.25
This shift away from class actions leads to two concerns. First,
because large class actions yield substantial plaintiffs’ attorneys’
fees,26 smaller classes and nonclass aggregation are more expensive,
less lucrative, and thus less attractive business ventures. Aggregate
lawsuits likewise require greater expenditures in client advertising and
administrative costs. Funding an all-inclusive class action, particularly
a Rule 23(b)(2) class where members cannot opt out, is more economical for plaintiffs’ attorneys than filing thousands of individual claims.
Aggregate litigation’s increased cost means that fewer attorneys may
enter the field, which could dampen competition among the plaintiffs’
bar and may eventually affect the quality of the representation and
the ability to sue.27 Moreover, because aggregate lawsuits are more
expensive for plaintiffs’ attorneys to initiate, fewer class actions may
trigger an access to justice problem, undermine private enforcement
efforts, and cause a market gap in litigation funding. As this section
discusses, in the short term, these added expenses most likely mean
that existing plaintiffs’ firms with insufficient capital will look increasingly to third-party funders such as hedge funds and private investors
to cover litigation costs. Alternative funding sources are controversial
even in run-of-the-mill litigation, such as car accidents and other per-

tion of the litigation.” Wal-Mart, 131 S. Ct. at 2559 (quoting Richard A. Nagareda, Class
Certification in the Age of Aggregate Proof, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 97, 132 (2009)).
25 FED. R. CIV. P. 20, 42; see also Emery G. Lee III & Thomas E. Willging, Impact of
the Class Action Fairness Act on the Federal Courts: Preliminary Findings from Phase
Two’s Pre-CAFA Sample of Diversity Class Actions, 256 F.R.D. 214, 219 tbl.4 (2009)
(showing a decline in class certification motions from seventy percent of cases in 1996 to
just twenty-four percent in 2009); Thomas E. Willging & Emery G. Lee III, From Class
Actions to Multidistrict Consolidations: Aggregate Mass-Tort Litigation After Ortiz, 58 U.
KAN. L. REV. 775, 793 (2010) (“In sum, the existing empirical evidence is consistent with
the thesis that class certification has become less likely in the post-Ortiz period.”). For
more information on the differences between class actions and aggregate litigation, see
generally Elizabeth Chamblee Burch, Procedural Justice in Nonclass Aggregation, 44
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1 (2009), where I describe the procedural justice problems that
arise when aggregate litigation proceeds outside of the class action’s protections.
26 Theodore Eisenberg & Geoffrey P. Miller, Attorney Fees and Expenses in Class
Action Settlements: 1993-2008, 7 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 248, 250 (2010).
27 See RAND CTR. FOR LAW & PUB. POLICY, THIRD-PARTY LITIGATION FUNDING &
CLAIM TRANSFER: TRENDS AND IMPLICATIONS FOR THE CIVIL JUSTICE SYSTEM 19 (2010),
available at http://www.rand.org/pubs/conf_proceedings/2010/RAND_CF272.pdf (“Thirdparty funding has the potential to make some smaller firms contenders for large cases,
which may, in turn, cause increased competition with larger firms.”).
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sonal-injury cases.28 Not surprisingly, aggregate litigation compounds
the controversy.
Second, as more cases proceed as nonclass aggregation, attorneys
will continue to experiment with ethically questionable means for
achieving litigation closure and recouping their financial investment.
In mass torts, without the closure that class settlements once delivered, attorneys on both sides have turned to private contracts to
achieve finality. These settlements regularly include walk-away provisions that allow defendants to withdraw their offers if too few claimants agree.29 And at least one has required participating plaintiffs’
attorneys to recommend the deal to one hundred percent of their clients and withdraw from representing those who decline.30 Others add
“bonus” payments if one hundred percent of the plaintiffs settle,
thereby creating social pressure to achieve consensus.31 Consequently,
the second part of this section chronicles these issues and the contingent-fee expenditures that fuel them.
A. Funding Gaps and Fee Awards
Private lawsuits are the principal vehicles for enforcing substantive rights in many areas like employment discrimination, securities
fraud, products liability, consumer fraud, antitrust, and civil rights.32
28 E.g., Appelbaum, Lawsuit Loans, supra note 9, at A1 (criticizing the rise of alternative litigation financing).
29 See Paul H. Edelman et al., The Allocation Problem in Multiple-Claimant
Representations, 14 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 95, 101 (2006) (discussing the prevalence of walkaway provisions).
30 See Initial Settlement Agreement, In re Vioxx Prods. Liab. Litig., MDL No. 1657, ¶
1.2.8.1 (E.D. La. 2007), available at http://www.merck.com/newsroom/vioxx/pdf/Settlement
_Agreement.pdf (including mandatory recommendation and withdrawal provisions). After
some plaintiffs’ attorneys contended the Vioxx settlement conflicted with ethical rules, the
settlement agreement was clarified to suggest that the attorneys should recommend the
deal only if it was in the client’s best interest. Howard M. Erichson & Benjamin C.
Zipursky, Consent Versus Closure, 96 CORNELL L. REV. 265, 281 (2011); Alex Berenson,
Some Lawyers Seek Changes in Vioxx Settlement, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 20, 2007), http://
www.nytimes.com/2007/12/20/business/20cnd-vioxx.html. For an overview of how these
provisions exert ethical pressure on plaintiffs’ counsel, see Howard M. Erichson, The
Trouble with All-or-Nothing Settlements, 58 U. KAN. L. REV. 979 (2010).
31 See Mireya Navarro, Deal Is Reached on Health Costs of 9/11 Workers, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 12, 2010, at A1 [hereinafter Navarro, Health Costs of 9/11] (describing the bonus
arrangement found in the Ground Zero settlement).
32 I proceed from the notion that most aggregate litigation begins on a good faith basis.
While the occasional bad faith lawsuit may still exist, there are substantial barriers to initiating meritless litigation such as the hefty costs of initiating and pursuing large-scale litigation, exacting pleading standards, and Rule 11 which imposes sanctions on attorneys who
initiate frivolous lawsuits. See generally Elizabeth Chamblee Burch, CAFA’s Impact on
Litigation as a Public Good, 29 CARDOZO L. REV. 2517, 2520-23 (2008) (claiming that class
actions can be a public good) [hereinafter Burch, CAFA’s Impact]; Elizabeth Chamblee
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They provide a failsafe for agency capture and a check on government
abuse and political overreaching.33 As the courts and Congress have
steadily curtailed the plaintiffs’ bar’s ability to pursue these cases as
class actions, they have affected the means of enforcing a wide range
of civil rights, complex statutory schemes, and constitutional rights
that past courts willingly certified as Rule 23(b)(2) class actions.34 For
example, district and appellate courts have already relied on the reasoning in Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes to decertify or decline to certify toxic tort cases,35 environmental law cases,36 product liability
cases,37 breach of contract claims,38 and Truth in Lending Act
claims.39
Although it is difficult to predict exactly how these changes will
affect substantive enforcement goals, if the history of mass torts is
indicative, it illustrates the adaptability and flexibility of the plaintiffs’
bar.40 Rather than evaporating with the mass-tort class action, plaintiffs’ attorneys have moved into nonclass aggregation. Product liability
multidistrict litigations from 2004 to 2008 involved 1832 different law
firms, and the Vioxx litigation alone involved 1100 law firms.41 While
Burch, Securities Class Actions as Pragmatic Ex Post Regulation, 43 GA. L. REV. 63 (2008)
(contending that securities class actions play a beneficial role in society).
33 John C. Coffee, Jr., Litigation Governance: Taking Accountability Seriously, 110
COLUM. L. REV. 288, 345 (2010).
34 E.g., Davis v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co. Consol., 516 F.3d 955, 961 (11th Cir. 2008)
(litigating employment discrimination claims); Bolton v. Murray Envelope Corp., 553 F.2d
881 (5th Cir. 1977) (same); Woodard v. Online Info. Servs., 191 F.R.D. 502 (E.D.N.C.
2000) (litigating Fair Debt Collection Practices Act violations); Irwin v. Mascott, 96 F.
Supp. 2d 968 (N.D. Cal. 1999) (same).
35 E.g., Opinion and Order of the Court Denying Class Certification, Henry v. Dow
Chem. Co., No. 03-47775-NZ, 2011 WL 3269118, at *2-5 (Mich. Cir. Ct. July 18, 2011).
36 E.g., Gates v. Rohm & Haas Co., 655 F.3d 255, 274 (3d Cir. 2011).
37 E.g., In re Bisphenol-A (BPA) Polycarbonate Plastic Prods. Liab. Litig., 276 F.R.D.
336, 344 (W.D. Mo. 2011).
38 E.g., Altier v. Worley Catastrophe Response, LLC, Nos. 1-241, 11-242, 2011 WL
3205229 (E.D. La. July 26, 2011).
39 E.g., Haynes v. Planet Automall, Inc., 276 F.R.D. 65 (E.D.N.Y. 2011).
40 Still, some of these cases are likely to disappear from litigation entirely: for instance,
claims that defendants can avoid through arbitration agreements, like consumer fraud
claims and at least some employment disputes. Although public agencies like the SEC,
DOJ, and EEOC can avoid the problems with complying with Rule 23, they may not be
able to obtain the full monetary remedies available to private plaintiffs. See, e.g., Jefferson
v. Ingersoll Int’l Inc., 195 F.3d 894, 899 (7th Cir. 1999) (noting that the EEOC may not
request the same relief that private plaintiffs request, including the full extent of monetary
relief). This Article focuses on the alternative problem of nonclass aggregation.
41 Affidavit of Joshua D. Wright, Memorandum in Support of Motion for
Reconsideration/Revision of Order Capping Contingency Fees and Alternatively for Entry
of Judgment, at 10–11, In re Vioxx Prods. Liab. Litig., MDL No. 1657 (E.D. La. Dec. 10,
2008) (on file with the New York University Law Review); Charles Silver & Geoffrey P.
Miller, The Quasi–Class Action Method of Managing Multi-district Litigations: Problems
and a Proposal, 63 VAND. L. REV. 107, 138 (2010).
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this suggests that enforcement options remain for individually marketable claims, the move away from class action puts additional pressure
on the agency relationship by adding expense and circumventing welltraveled paths for achieving wholesale resolution. That pressure continues to bedevil mass-tort litigation, and with the tightening of class
remedies across the board, it is likely to spread to group-based litigation in other substantive areas as well.
Entrepreneurial private attorneys typically do not work for free.
Instead, they rely on either congressionally approved fee-shifting statutes or contingent fees to compensate them. The contingent fee is the
usual method for remunerating plaintiffs’ attorneys in areas like mass
torts,42 whereas Congress authorizes fee-shifting statutes in civil rights
litigation, such as the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, Title
VII, and the Americans with Disabilities Act.43
In class actions, judges typically employ the percentage of the
common fund method for calculating reasonable contingent-fee
awards and the lodestar method under fee-shifting statutes.44
Empirical studies, however, have consistently shown that the size of
the class’s recovery is the “overwhelmingly important determinant” of
the fee award, regardless of which test courts use.45 When class actions
were commonplace, few plaintiffs ever opted out—which meant that
when courts awarded attorneys’ fees based on client recovery, plaintiffs’ attorneys tended to receive higher awards.46 Although all mass
litigation is expensive, tightening class certification standards means
more risk and less reward for plaintiffs’ lawyers. The current eco42 For background on the economics of contingency fees, see generally Albert H. Choi,
Allocating Settlement Authority Under a Contingent-Fee Arrangement, 32 J. LEGAL STUD.
585 (2003), and Rudy Santore & Alan D. Viard, Legal Fee Restrictions, Moral Hazard, and
Attorney Rents, 44 J. L. & ECON. 549 (2001).
43 Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C. § 626(b) (2006); Civil
Rights Attorney’s Fees Awards Act of 1976, 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b) (2006); Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k) (2006); Americans with Disabilities Act of
1990, 42 U.S.C. § 12205 (2006).
44 See, e.g., Staton v. Boeing Co., 327 F.3d 938, 965 (9th Cir. 2003) (using the lodestar
method to award reasonable fees under a fee-shifting statute). Courts employing the lodestar method multiply a reasonable number of attorney hours by a reasonable hourly rate
and then use various factors to adjust the final rate. See Gisbrecht v. Barnhart, 535 U.S. 789
(2002); Charles Silver, Due Process and the Lodestar Method: You Can’t Get There from
Here, 74 TUL. L. REV. 1809 (2000) (discussing problems with the lodestar method). On feeshifting statutes generally, see Note, State Attorney Fee Shifting Statutes: Are We Quietly
Repealing the American Rule?, 47 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 321, 322-23 (1984).
45 Eisenberg & Miller, supra note 26, at 250.
46 See Theodore Eisenberg & Geoffrey P. Miller, Attorney Fees in Class Action
Settlements: An Empirical Study, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 27, 28-29 (2004) (“We find
that the level of client recovery is by far the most important determinant of the attorney
fee amount.”).
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nomic climate only exacerbates the problem: Law firms are unable to
pay their own expenses, much less take on years of litigation without a
payday in sight.47
1. The Financial Risks of Aggregate Litigation
This section first considers the financial risks involved for plaintiffs’ attorneys in all large-scale litigation, then the specific challenges
that multidistrict litigation adds. To initiate aggregate litigation, attorneys must develop both “generic” and “specific” assets.48 Generic
assets include things like expert witnesses and discovery documents
that establish general causation and apply broadly to the attorney’s
portfolio of similarly situated clients. A simple failure-to-warn claim
requires understanding how much the medical community knew about
the risk before a plaintiff could ever demonstrate that the defendant
breached its duty.49 And this requires experts, document review, witness interviews, and extensive timelines about who knew what and
when.50 These assets are particularly risky to develop, given that other
lawyers could free-ride on one attorney’s investment. Specific assets,
on the other hand, include the substantial expense of developing the
facts of each client’s case as well as proving specific causation—that
the product caused this plaintiff’s injury or that an employer discriminated against this employee.51
Developing these assets takes substantial time and capital.
Investments can take years to recoup, which means that plaintiffs’ law
firms might have to pool their resources, borrow funds from banks, or,
as explored in Part III, request financing from third parties.52 Back in
1995, attorney Michael Pretl, who sued A.H. Robbins in the Dalkon
Shield litigation, reported: “We handled over 1,000 Dalkon cases, and
it took 20 years before we showed a profit . . . . We borrowed heavily
at high interest rates to finance the litigation. Even though we settled
47 As one law firm’s founding partner explained in the process of going out of business,
“It’s a sign of the current times. Banks are getting a lot more nervous with law firm finance
and are pulling loans more quickly.” Ben Moshinsky, Focus: Orchard Solicitors, Til Debt
Do Us Part, THELAWYER.COM (Mar. 16, 2009), http://www.thelawyer.com/focus-orchardsolicitors-til-debt-do-us-part/137154.article.
48 See RICHARD A. NAGAREDA, MASS TORTS IN A WORLD OF SETTLEMENT 13–14
(2007).
49 Id. (discussing plaintiffs’ attorneys’ generic assets).
50 See id. at 13.
51 See id.; see also Stephen C. Yeazell, Brown, the Civil Rights Movement, and the Silent
Litigation Revolution, 57 VAND. L. REV. 1975, 1194 (2004) (“[I]n lawsuits, law is relatively
cheap, but facts are typically expensive.”).
52 See NAGAREDA, supra note 48, at 14.
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$55 million in claims, this will be the first year we’ll be in the black.”53
Vioxx is a more recent example. One plaintiffs’ lawyer estimated that
a single Vioxx case initially cost between $1 million and $1.5 million to
develop.54 But once the attorneys turned their collective wisdom into
trial packages and put the infrastructure in place, others could litigate
similar cases for around $200,000, thereby creating a disincentive to
develop early cases.55
Creative financing schemes that help cover and disperse these
costs are nothing new. After spending more than $3 million on the
Agent Orange litigation in the mid-1980s, the plaintiffs’ attorneys
could not afford to continue litigating.56 To avoid dismissing the case,
a reconstituted Plaintiffs’ Management Committee allowed six of the
nine members to advance funds toward developing generic assets,
with each dollar the “investor-attorney” funded repaid threefold if
plaintiffs prevailed—a 300% return.57 Judge Weinstein and the
Second Circuit reached conflicting outcomes as to the arrangement’s
permissibility.58 Judge Weinstein insisted that the Committee increase
the decision-making authority of the lawyers working on the case, as
opposed to those just investing in it, but he sidestepped any ethical
dilemmas by viewing the Committee as “an ad hoc law firm.”59
Because the Committee shared traditional attorneys’ obligations of
loyalty and confidentiality to class members and “served only to redistribute attorneys’ fees,” not to reduce client benefits, the only danger
was that “investor” members might clamor to settle early in order to
recoup their investment.60 The Second Circuit, on the other hand, disagreed with the law firm analogy, found that the agreement created
impermissible conflicts of interest between the investor-attorneys and
the class, and invalidated the agreement.61
53 Gregory C. Baumann, Wanted: Law Firm with Guts, THE DAILY RECORD, Nov. 17,
1995, at 1.
54 Joe Nocera, Forget Fair; It’s Litigation as Usual, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 17, 2007), http://
www.nytimes.com/2007/11/17/business/17nocera.html?pagewanted=all.
55 See id.
56 JACK B. WEINSTEIN, INDIVIDUAL JUSTICE IN MASS TORT LITIGATION 77 (1995).
57 Vincent Robert Johnson, Ethical Limitations on Creative Financing of Mass Tort
Class Actions, 54 BROOK. L. REV. 539, 549–50 (1988).
58 See In re “Agent Orange” Prod. Liab. Litig., 818 F.2d 216, 218 (2d Cir. 1987) (invalidating the agreement), rev’d, In re “Agent Orange” Prod. Liab. Litig., 611 F. Supp. 1452,
1453 (E.D.N.Y. 1985) (upholding the agreement).
59 WEINSTEIN, supra note 56, at 77; see also In re “Agent Orange,” 611 F. Supp. at
1461–62 (considering a number of factors in favor of authorizing the agreement).
60 WEINSTEIN, supra note 56, at 77–78; see also In re “Agent Orange,” 611 F. Supp. at
1460–61 (discussing incentives toward early settlement).
61 In re “Agent Orange,” 818 F.2d at 225–26; Johnson, supra note 57, at 553.
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2. The Added Risks of Multidistrict Litigation
Nonclass aggregation presents an additional set of risks for plaintiffs’ attorneys that militates in favor of creative financing. First, these
lawyers are forced to take on substantial administrative costs. In nonclass aggregation, attorneys recruit and interact with individual clients,
which is significantly more expensive than interacting with a few class
representatives and receiving fees based on benefiting the whole
class.62 For instance, attorneys in the Vioxx Litigation Consortium
considered 30,000 potential clients and accepted only 2000—a process
which took a combined 1,601,150 hours by staff, paralegals, attorneys,
nurse practitioners, and medical experts at a cost of $13.5 million.63
Second, multidistrict litigation increases coordination costs and
decreases attorney control. Although class-action attorneys must
often coordinate among large legal teams within their firms and occasionally jockey with other attorneys to become class counsel, multidistrict litigation significantly alters these dynamics. Coordination
typically occurs both informally and formally. Informally, plaintiffs’
attorneys may form groups and coalitions on their own, such as the
Vioxx Litigation Consortium (which included lawyers from five law
firms) and the Polybutylene Plumbing Litigation (which included lawyers from forty-nine law firms).64 Formally, judges handpick experienced attorneys to serve on executive committees, plaintiffs’ steering
committees, and specialized committees.65 These formal and informal
aspects often meld. For example, plaintiffs’ attorneys selected Chris
Seeger and Andy Birchfield as co-lead attorneys for the Vioxx
Plaintiffs’ Steering Committee over an informal dinner at Antoine’s in
New Orleans; thus, it was a foregone conclusion when Judge Fallon
subsequently formally appointed them to the position.66 This selection
process relegates disfavored attorneys to a secondary status, renders
them unable to control their cases, and decreases their
compensation.67
62 See Joshua Hamerman, A PE Fund To Sponsor Corporate Litigation, INVESTMENT
DEALERS’ DIG., Jan. 22, 2010, at 1, 17 (“In the U.K. [where class actions are opt-in],
you . . . need to literally recruit claimants one by one; as a result the administrative costs
can become very large relative to the action.”).
63 Silver & Miller, supra note 41, at 128.
64 In re Polybutylene Plumbing Litig., 23 S.W.3d 428, 432 (Tex. App. 2000); see also
Silver & Miller, supra note 41, at 126 (discussing these ad hoc consortiums).
65 See Dennis E. Curtis & Judith Resnik, Contingency Fees in Mass Torts: Access, Risk,
and the Provision of Legal Services When Layers of Lawyers Work for Individuals and
Collectives of Clients, 47 DEPAUL L. REV. 425, 431 (1998) (observing that plaintiffs’
steering committees might be self-selected through colleagues or through designation by a
judge).
66 SNIGDHA PRAKASH, ALL THE JUSTICE MONEY CAN BUY 13–14 (2011).
67 Silver & Miller, supra note 41, at 118–20.
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Third, multidistrict litigation means less certain fee awards than
in individual cases or class actions. In individual contingent-fee cases,
clients sign retainer agreements allocating their attorney around
thirty-three percent of the litigation’s proceeds.68 In class actions,
judges award attorneys’ fees based on the percentage of the common
fund method (often with a lodestar check), which ranges from eleven
to thirty-nine percent, with an average of around twenty percent.69
But backroom jockeying for key positions, judicial creation of and
appointment to various litigation committees, ad hoc fee cuts, and the
comparative lack of transparency and certainty with regard to judicial
intervention make multidistrict litigation a riskier venture.70 Even
though clients involved in multidistrict litigation have individually
retained their attorneys and thus have agreed to set contingent fees,
some judges reduce and reallocate those fees to compensate attorneys
performing common-benefit work and to minimize plaintiffs’ litigation
costs.71
For example, the fee cap in the Guidant litigation meant that lawyers on the case’s outskirts—whose clients had agreed to a forty percent contingent fee—received only twenty-eight percent of their
clients’ gross recovery.72 Even the “chosen” lawyers on key committees are not safe from this uncertainty, as the recent Vioxx skirmish
over $350 million in common-benefit fees demonstrated.73 Divvying
68 See Herbert M. Kritzer, The Wages of Risk: The Returns of Contingency Fee Legal
Practice, 47 DEPAUL L. REV. 267, 285–86 (1998) (discussing characteristics of contingency
fees).
69 See Eisenberg & Miller, supra note 26, at 258 (studying class-action awards from
1993 to 2008 and observing that “[t]he mean fee to recovery ratio was 0.23, or 23 percent of
the class award, but this percent varies by recovery size”); Brian T. Fitzpatrick, An
Empirical Study of Class Action Settlements and Their Fee Awards, 7 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL
STUD. 811, 831 (2010) (finding that fees and expenses averaged twenty percent of total
settlement amounts in 2007).
70 “[T]rial judges may also appoint lead counsel and plaintiff steering committees,
transforming these attorneys into lawyers for a group, albeit lawyers with an even less
defined set of ethical obligations than the class action lawyer.” Judith Resnik, Aggregation,
Settlement, and Dismay, 80 CORNELL L. REV. 918, 931 (1995). See Charles Silver, The
Responsibilities of Lead Lawyers and Judges in Multidistrict Litigations, 79 FORDHAM L.
REV. 1985, 1986–87 (2011) (discussing the ways in which steering committees control multidistrict litigation and the little control plaintiffs have over lead attorneys).
71 See Silver & Miller, supra note 41, at 139 (discussing fee caps imposed on “disabled
lawyers”).
72 In re Guidant Corp. Implantable Defibrillators Prods. Liab. Litig., MDL No. 051708, 2008 WL 3896006, at *10 (D. Minn. Aug. 21, 2008) (involving a large-scale multidistrict litigation that Judge Frank dubbed a quasi–class action); see also Silver & Miller,
supra note 41, at 129–30 (discussing fee allocation problems in multidistrict litigations).
73 When a judge appoints common-benefit counsel to perform work for the benefit of
all plaintiffs involved in a multidistrict litigation those attorneys’ fees are often called
“common-benefit fees.”
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up that money required a special committee, a discovery master,
rounds of objections, a weeklong hearing, and, ultimately, a 132-page
court order.74
The same uncertainty plagued plaintiffs’ lawyers in the Ground
Zero workers case. Judge Hellerstein cut their fees from the contractual amount of thirty-three percent to twenty-five percent, and prohibited them from charging clients some $6.1 million in interest costs
from third-party financing.75 Moreover, when more than ninety-five
percent of plaintiffs consented to the proposed settlement, thereby
swelling the compensation from $625 million to $680 million, Judge
Hellerstein forbade their lawyers from sharing in the increase. He
explained, “Such fees, taken after plaintiffs’ counsel have had all their
expenses paid out of the settlement funds, are more than sufficient to
compensate counsel for their representation.”76 Plaintiffs’ lawyers, not
surprisingly, considered appealing the ruling. One lead attorney
explained, “We should be paid because it was part of the deal,” and
noted that the bonus payments were “something we had to litigate.”77
Of course, in some ways, hindsight makes it easy to cut fees and
to contend that plaintiffs’ attorneys are overcompensated, particularly
when some benefit greatly from others’ efforts and from economies of
scale. Still, litigation’s risks and rewards cannot be measured in a
single case; instead, lawyers tend to think of contingent-fee cases as a
portfolio of risk.78 Diversifying cases diversifies risk, such that the
winning cases finance not only their own costs, but the costs of the
losing cases as well.79 It is this insurance-like dimension of spreading
risk across clients that judges may fail to appreciate.
Because diversification among clients and cases is easier in individual litigation, attorneys who practice in aggregate litigation often
turn to creative financing arrangements to spread risk. Historical doctrines like champerty and barratry would ban not only these arrangements but also class actions, because they promote “officious
intermeddling in a suit that . . . belongs to [no] one” and “excit[e] and
74 In re Vioxx Prods. Liab. Litig., 802 F. Supp. 2d 740 (E.D. La. 2011); Alison Frankel,
Vioxx Judge Steps in To Split $350 Ml Plaintiffs Lawyer Pie, REUTERS (Aug. 11, 2011),
http://blogs.reuters.com/alison-frankel/2011/08/11/vioxx-judge-steps-in-to-split-350-mlplaintiffs-lawyer-pie/.
75 See Mark Hamblett, Plaintiffs’ Lawyers in 9/11 Cases Lose Bid To Recoup Interest
Costs, N.Y. L.J., Aug. 30, 2010, at 1.
76 Mireya Navarro, Terms Met, Payout Rises for Workers at 9/11 Site, N.Y. TIMES, Sept.
13, 2011, at A28 [hereinafter Navarro, Terms Met].
77 Id.
78 See HERBERT M. KRITZER, RISKS, REPUTATIONS, AND REWARDS 10–19 (2004)
(comparing contingent-fee practice to portfolio management).
79 Id. at 16.
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stir[ ] up suits and quarrels.”80 But concerns about deterring wrongdoing and equitably compensating large plaintiff groups have long
trumped these antiquated deontological and professional concerns.81
Eliminating old bars against contingent-fee arrangements and compensating class counsel based on common fund and restitutionary theories encourage non-governmental lawyers to act on behalf of
plaintiffs who lack the economic incentive or funding to sue.82
Although the legal system is no longer concerned about exciting and
stirring up mass litigation, using the contingent fee to compensate
plaintiffs’ attorneys has led to a new concern: It can distort incentives
in the lawyer-client relationship.
B. Aggregation Minus a Monitor: Agency Costs as a
Bundling Problem
Contingent fees augment the lawyer-client relationship by
making the attorney the financier. She is an agent, a creditor, an
investment banker, and a risk manager; the litigation is a joint venture
with the client.83 But bundling these two roles—financier and
advisor—breeds attorney-client conflicts of interest. To be sure, other
billing arrangements create perverse incentives too. Hourly billing
incentivizes attorneys to work slowly and to prolong lawsuits by filing
unnecessary motions. And even pro bono services may encourage
attorneys to skimp on research and development so that they can
return to paying clients. But contingent fees spawn nearly all the quintessential agency problems in aggregate litigation.84 As Judge
Weinstein observed after handling the Agent Orange, asbestos, and
diethylstilbestrol (DES) cases, most mass-tort lawyers are “focused on
80

4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *134–35.
These concerns about deterring wrongdoing and equitably compensating plaintiffs,
particularly in the civil rights context, led to the enactment of Rule 23. FED. R. CIV. P.
23(b)(2) advisory committee’s note.
82 See Boeing Co. v. Van Gemert, 444 U.S. 472, 478–79 (1980) (discussing the history of
the common fund doctrine); Charles Silver, A Restitutionary Theory of Attorneys’ Fees in
Class Actions, 76 CORNELL L. REV. 656, 663-66 (1991) (contending that the restitutionary
theory supports the payment of attorneys who win class actions).
83 See Kutak Symposium: Professional Responsibility and the Corporate Lawyer, 13
GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 331, 340–41 (2000) (observing the same phenomenon in the classaction context); Charles Silver, Merging Roles: Mass Tort Lawyers as Agents and Trustees,
31 PEPP. L. REV. 301, 302–03 (2003) (positing that in mass-tort representations, as in class
actions, “[t]he plaintiffs’ attorneys provide crucial financing”).
84 For background on the principal-agent problems with contingency fees, see generally
James D. Dana, Jr. & Kathryn E. Spier, Expertise and Contingent Fees: The Role of
Asymmetric Information in Attorney Compensation, J.L. ECON. & ORG. 349 (1993); Miller,
supra note 5; A. Mitchell Polinsky & Daniel L. Rubinfeld, Aligning the Interests of Lawyers
and Clients, 5 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 165 (2003).
81
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getting cash for the individual client, obtaining a large fee, and closing
the file as quickly and with as little effort as possible.”85
Contingent fees are less problematic in individual and class litigation. In individual litigation, a plaintiff can monitor the attorney herself. Although she may lack the expertise to evaluate legal arguments
and motions, she can insist on explanations from the attorney, request
additional information, and determine whether the attorney’s performance conforms to her expectations. Because class members are
typically uninvolved in class actions, Rule 23 imposes fiduciary duties
on the attorney to act in the whole class’s best interest and requires
the judge to certify that the attorney adequately represents the class;
to ensure that any settlement is fair, reasonable, and adequate; and to
approve attorneys’ fee requests.86 Nonclass aggregation, however,
lacks these monitoring options. Clients are disaggregated, and a single
attorney often represents hundreds or thousands of clients with
roughly similar claims, making meaningful client monitoring difficult.87 Because judges do not certify plaintiffs’ claims as a class, the
judge has far less authority to police the agency relationship and the
settlement.
My point is not that all or even most plaintiffs’ attorneys are
unethical, but that the current incentive structure is open to abuse in
nonclass aggregation. Paying attention to situations in which attorneys’ interests diverge from their clients’ interests and eliminating
some sources of tension can foster fidelity and loyalty. This section
describes the theoretical situations in which an attorney’s interests
might diverge from her client’s and provides illustrative, anecdotal
evidence of questionable practices.88
85

WEINSTEIN, supra note 56, at 49–50.
FED. R. CIV. P. 23. For a discussion of the trial judge as a fiduciary for nonparticipating class members, see also Reynolds v. Beneficial Nat’l Bank, 288 F.3d 277 (7th Cir.
2002); Nancy Morawetz, Bargaining, Class Representation, and Fairness, 54 OHIO ST. L.J. 1
(1993); Chris Brummer, Note, Sharpening the Sword: Class Certification, Appellate Review,
and the Role of the Fiduciary Judge in Class Action Lawsuits, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 1042,
1060–62 (2004).
87 As others and I have suggested, a plaintiffs’ steering committee—made up of the
claimants, not their attorneys—might also perform a monitoring function. See Elizabeth
Chamblee Burch, Litigating Together: Social, Moral, and Legal Obligations, 91 B.U. L.
REV. 87, 126 (2011) [hereinafter Burch, Litigating Together]; Silver, supra note 7, at 759.
The catch is that, for procedural justice purposes, the plaintiffs themselves must still have
the opportunity to play a role in group deliberation. See Burch, supra, at 126 & n.173.
88 Of course, these examples may come from outlier cases and may not reflect business
as usual. The point is to lend context to the analytical observation that the incentive structure is open to abuse, not to suggest that these examples are the norm. There are few
empirical studies on disciplinary violations that offer hard evidence of these practices, and
many violations remain unreported. One study that does exist did not specifically examine
aggregate litigation or class actions, but demonstrated a high percentage of disciplinary
86
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1. Quick Settlement Sell-Outs. The tangled advisor-lender relationship may motivate attorneys to settle quickly and cheaply if doing
so allows them to collect their contingent fees and to move on to other
cases.89 If a defendant offers to settle a case for a nominal value soon
after receiving a complaint, the plaintiff’s attorney might prefer to
accept the offer because she would receive her fee and then be free to
litigate other cases, even if further work on the case might yield a
marginally higher value for her client.90 For example, suppose the
attorney thinks that working on the case for another year might produce a settlement offer that is $300,000 more than the current offer,
but that the additional year of work would cost her $150,000.
Assuming a one-third contingent fee, she would receive only $100,000
as compensation for the $150,000 of additional work. The attorney
would prefer to accept the initial settlement offer, but the clients
might want her to press forward, since their settlement value would be
greater. Thus, the attorney’s loyalty is divided between her selfinterest and her clients’ interests.
2. Collusive Settlements. A close cousin of the quick settlement,
collusive settlements may occur because plaintiff and defense attorneys are often repeat players.91 Knowing that they will meet again,
they may adjust their litigation tactics and settlements to reflect past
interactions and future negotiations rather than the present case’s
merits.92 Because developing case-specific expertise is costly, both
plaintiff and defense attorneys specialize. For instance, a handful of
repeat-player law firms usually handle the majority of mass-tort or
employment-discrimination cases.93 Consider the Dalkon Shield litigaviolations among plaintiff-side personal injury attorneys. See Patricia W. Hatamyar &
Kevin M. Simmons, Are Women More Ethical Lawyers? An Empirical Study, 31 FLA. ST.
U. L. REV. 785, 818 & tbl.12 (2004) (“[T]he types of legal matters in which disciplinary
violations were most often found in our sample were domestic relations (20%), personal
injury representing the plaintiff (19%), and criminal defense (14%).”).
89 See Silver, supra note 83, at 306–07.
90 See Miller, supra note 5, at 190.
91 See Marc Galanter, Why the “Haves” Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the Limits of
Legal Change, 9 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 95, 97–103 (1974) (discussing problems with repeat
players).
92 See KRITZER, supra note 78, at 15 (describing lawyers’ management of risk); Edward
H. Cooper, Aggregation and Settlement of Mass Torts, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 1943, 1951–52
(2000) (noting that the presence of repeat players may lead to “results . . . similar to the
problem of ‘regulatory capture’”); cf. Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591,
625–28 (1997) (reasoning that the goal of injured plaintiffs to maximize their payout “tugs
against the interest” of class members who are asymptomatic—to preserve funds for future
payment). For a discussion of related problems in the class action context, see Hay &
Rosenberg, supra note 4, at 1390–91.
93 See John C. Coffee, Jr., Class Wars: The Dilemma of the Mass Tort Class Action, 95
COLUM. L. REV. 1343, 1364 (1995).
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tion: Six attorneys represented 8039 claimants (an average of 1340
each), and forty-three attorneys represented the remaining 13,174
claimants.94 Likewise, only a handful of plaintiffs’ law firms represented asbestos plaintiffs,95 and asbestos defense attorneys organized
a single consortium to negotiate a settlement.96 Their negotiations
resulted in a complaint, answer, joint motion for conditional class certification, and proposed settlement all being filed within a single day.97
Although the trial court approved the settlement agreement, the
Supreme Court famously reversed, in part, because the plaintiffs’
attorneys struck a better deal for their present inventory of clients
than for those with diseases that would manifest in the future.98
Class actions contain built-in protections that help to guard
against collusion: Judges must review class settlements for fairness,
reasonableness, and adequacy; class objectors can object to unfair
terms and attorneys’ fees; and state attorneys general can intervene
and object.99 Nonclass aggregation, on the other hand, lacks these
safeguards.
3. Underfunded Litigation. Given aggregate litigation’s expense, a
real danger exists that the contingent-fee attorney may run out of
resources with which to prosecute the case. Consequently, she might
cut corners in critical areas like expert witness fees or discovery,
quickly settle a few cases to bankroll the rest, or request to dismiss the
case.100 For example, the plaintiffs’ attorneys who initiated the Agent
Orange litigation spent millions pursuing the case and eventually
exhausted their capital.101 Although a new financial group took over
the Agent Orange litigation, the same was not true in the New Jersey
tobacco litigation.102 There, plaintiffs’ counsel tried to withdraw, but
94 Id.; Georgene M. Vairo, Reinventing Civil Procedure: Will the New Procedural
Regime Help Resolve Mass Torts?, 59 BROOK. L. REV. 1065, 1075 n.47 (1993).
95 See Deborah R. Hensler & Mark A. Peterson, Understanding Mass Personal Injury
Litigation: A Socio-legal Analysis, 59 BROOK. L. REV. 961, 966 (1993).
96 See Harry H. Wellington, Asbestos: The Private Management of a Public Problem, 33
CLEV. ST. L. REV. 375, 387–89 (1985). The group was first known as the Asbestos Claims
Facility. It was later replaced by a smaller group, the Center for Claims Resolution, which
represented twenty-one corporations that manufactured asbestos. See Lawrence
Fitzpatrick, The Center for Claims Resolution, 53 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 13, 17 (1990).
97 Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 601 (1997).
98 Id. at 628.
99 28 U.S.C. § 1715 (2006) (requiring notice to state and federal officials of proposed
class-action settlements and barring final settlement within ninety days of such officials’
receipt of notice); FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e), (h) (requiring judges to approve class settlements
and permitting them to award attorneys’ fees).
100 See WEINSTEIN, supra note 56, at 77 (noting that attorneys might try to dismiss a case
that they can no longer afford to pursue).
101 Id. at 62.
102 See id.
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the court refused.103 Although courts have this authority in class
actions,104 no counterpart exists in aggregate litigation.
Even when attorneys can adequately fund the litigation, their
cost-sharing agreements can affect strategy. In the New Jersey Vioxx
litigation, Judge Carol E. Higbee proposed bifurcating four cases by
trying general liability and then specific causation; the plaintiffs’ lawyers agreed to split the trial costs four ways.105 But when attorney
Mark Lanier disagreed with the cases’ presentation order and balked
at Judge Higbee’s proposal to try his case as a stand-alone, he refused
to follow through with her plan. In his view, “he had put in more time
and money on the Vioxx litigation than any other lawyer in the
country—16 weeks in two trials and $4–5 million”:106
I’ll be quite candid with the Court, I really don’t think it is fair at
this point for me to go try one single case and have a third one go
up on appeal with Merck with another $2 million of my money and
another six weeks of my time tied up in it.107

Thus, litigation financing affects a lawsuit in more ways than one.
4. Astronomical Fees. Attorneys invest in and initiate aggregate
litigation to profit from fee awards. This is the private-attorneygeneral model’s aim: to encourage private lawyers to initiate civil
actions and thereby further the public interest, whether for selfish or
altruistic reasons.108 But attorneys’ fee awards are usually structured
so that the counsel’s stake far exceeds any one client’s recovery, which
can tempt lawyers to exploit that dynamic by charging unreasonable
fees. To combat this temptation in class actions, Rule 23(h) allows the
court to award “‘reasonable’ attorney fees and nontaxable costs.”109
By contrast, in individual cases, clients “negotiate” and consent to
contingent-fee percentages in the attorney’s retainer agreement.
Without class certification, aggregate litigation could fall prey to the
dangers of fee exploitation: A few seasoned lawyers press the defendant into settling and the other plaintiffs’ attorneys benefit from those
efforts without earning their fees. Although a few judges have invoked
103

Id.
FED. R. CIV. P. 23(g).
105 PRAKASH, supra note 66, at 30.
106 Id. at 33.
107 Id.(quoting attorney Mark Lauier).
108 See generally Burch, CAFA’s Impact, supra note 32, at 2524 (“Because class litigation performs . . . semi-public activities, the class action plaintiff’s bar has been labeled
‘private attorneys general.’”); John C. Coffee, Jr., Rescuing the Private Attorney General:
Why the Model of the Lawyer as Bounty Hunter Is Not Working, 42 MD. L. REV. 215, 218
(1983) (discussing the private attorney general model); Harry Kalven, Jr. & Maurice
Rosenfield, The Contemporary Function of the Class Suit, 8 U. CHI. L. REV. 684, 687, 721
(1941) (observing the need for private enforcement to complement government action).
109 FED. R. CIV. P. 23(h).
104
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their inherent equitable authority and have analogized to class actions
and the common-fund doctrine in order to reduce fee awards in multidistrict litigation,110 many do not, and the lack of clear authority and
guidance for those who do can lead to other inequities.111
5. Cram-Down Settlement Practices. Attorneys routinely devise
creative settlement provisions that deter class members from opting
out and coax them to accept settlements so the lawyers can collect
their fees.112 Class settlement designers have tried to include: “mostfavored-nation” provisions, which assure those who remain in the settlement that those who opt out will not receive a better deal and, if
they do, that the class will also benefit; liens on the defendant’s assets
in favor of the class, which require those who opt out to wait in line
behind class members for years before getting paid; and walk-away
provisions, which permit the defendant to withdraw the settlement
offer if too many class members opt out.113
In the class context, a judge must decide whether these provisions
are fair, reasonable, and adequate.114 But aggregate litigation lacks
not only these judicial safeguards; settlement designers have weakened the one protection claimants still have: the attorney’s duty of
loyalty. Defendants contract with plaintiffs’ law firms (as opposed to
with plaintiffs themselves), dub their agreement a “settlement,” and
require plaintiffs’ lawyers to withdraw from representing any client
who declines the offer.115 The deals essentially use plaintiffs’ attor110 See, e.g., In re Guidant Corp. Implantable Defibrillators Prods. Liab. Litig., MDL
No. 05-1708, 2008 WL 682174, at *19 (D. Minn. Mar. 7, 2008) (capping fee awards at
twenty percent, subject to the special master’s discretion); In re Vioxx Prods. Liab. Litig.,
574 F. Supp. 2d 606, 607 (E.D. La. 2008) (awarding thirty-two percent of the common fund
to attorneys); In re Zyprexa Prods. Liab. Litig., 424 F. Supp. 2d 488, 491 (E.D.N.Y. 2006)
(capping fees at thirty-five percent of the clients’ recovery, subject to the special masters’
discretion); Navarro, Terms Met, supra note 76, at A28 (discussing the fee cap set in the
Ground Zero litigation).
111 See Silver & Miller, supra note 41, at 110 (arguing that judicial ability to reduce fees
forces lawyers to be overly deferential, inserts unpredictability into contractually bargained
for fee awards, and ultimately advantages defendants).
112 See supra Part I.B (discussing quick settlement sell-outs).
113 See, e.g., In re Inter-Op Hip Prosthesis Liab. Litig., 204 F.R.D. 330, 354 (N.D. Ohio
2001) (upholding as fair and reasonable a Rule 23(b)(3) settlement agreement including a
most-favored-nation provision as well as a provision that created a lien on defendants’
assets); see generally Kathryn E. Spier, The Use of “Most-Favored-Nation” Clauses in
Settlement of Litigation, 34 RAND J. ECON. 78, 80 (2003).
114 See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e) (instructing courts that a proposed settlement may be
approved “only after a hearing and on finding that [it] . . . is fair, reasonable, and
adequate”).
115 These features figure most prominently in the Vioxx settlement, but contracts
between defendants and plaintiffs’ law firms extend back to asbestos and Owens Corning’s
National Settlement Program (NSP). See NAGAREDA, supra note 48, at 108–09 (describing
the Owens Corning NSP). After some plaintiffs’ attorneys contended that the mandatory
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neys’ large client inventories as leverage against the clients: If one
hundred percent of a lawyer’s clients do not agree, then the lawyer’s
investment in the case is largely unrecoverable.
The Vioxx settlement combined that leverage with an exit clause
for Merck. The settlement offer required each participating plaintiffs’
attorney to recommend the deal to one hundred percent of her clients
and to withdraw from representing those who declined.116 Unless
eighty-five percent of the claimants consented, Merck could walk
away without compensating either the plaintiffs or their attorneys.
Plaintiffs who refused the deal and could find alternative representation would continue to litigate before Judge Fallon, who announced
his preference for settlement from the beginning and appeared at a
press conference to “endorse” the deal.117
Similarly, in the Ground Zero workers’ case against New York
City, settlement designers tried to force plaintiffs to accept the settlement proposal through group cohesion. Attorneys offered a close-knit
community of firefighters and police officers $575 million if ninetyfive percent of them accepted, but, if one hundred percent agreed, the
amount would increase to $657.5 million.118 In a move that prompted
commentators to question the scope of judicial authority in nonclass
aggregation, Judge Hellerstein rejected the proposal, dubbed the compensation inadequate, and questioned the large attorneys’ fees.119
Eventually, attorneys increased the settlement amount to $625 million, so long as ninety-five percent approved—95.1% did.120
recommendation and withdrawal settlement provisions in the Vioxx litigation conflicted
with ethical rules, the provisions were reinterpreted to mean that attorneys should recommend the deal only if it were in their clients’ best interests. Erichson & Zipursky, supra
note 30, at 281; Berenson, supra note 30.
116 Initial Settlement Agreement at 5–6, In re Vioxx Prods. Liab. Litig., MDL No. 01657
(E.D. La. 2007), available at http://www.merck.com/newsroom/vioxx/pdf/Settlement_
Agreement.pdf.
117 See Jef Feeley & Leslie Snadowsky, Merck Vioxx Judge Threatens To End Suit
Consolidation, BLOOMBERG (Jan. 5, 2006), (observing Judge Fallon’s preference for settlement from the case’s beginning); see also Mark A. Peterson & Molly Selvin, Mass Justice:
The Limited and Unlimited Power of Courts, 54 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 227, 230 (1991)
(“Faced with mass tort litigation, judges are not simply neutral arbiters; rather, they have
strong personal incentives to speed the judicial process, save costs and labor, and reduce
redundancy.”); Peter H. Schuck, The Role of Judges in Settling Complex Cases: The Agent
Orange Example, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 337, 361–62 (1986) (arguing that Judge Weinstein in
the Agent Orange case was deeply committed to the success of the settlement agreement).
118 See Navarro, Health Costs of 9/11, supra note 31, at A1.
119 See Mireya Navarro, Empathetic Judge in 9/11 Suits Seen by Some as Interfering,
N.Y. TIMES, May 3, 2010, at A17 (questioning the scope of judicial authority in nonclass
aggregation).
120 Mireya Navarro, Sept. 11 Workers Agree To Settle Health Lawsuits, N.Y. TIMES, Nov.
20, 2010, at A1.
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6. Misallocation of Settlement Funds. Once defendants decide to
settle, they aim to end the litigation by including as many plaintiffs as
possible. But they care little about how settlement funds are distributed among the claimants and their lawyers.121 Settlement agreements
requiring nearly unanimous consent pressure plaintiffs’ attorneys to
push their clients to acquiesce so they can collect their fees.
Lump-sum settlements, however, where the defendant offers plaintiffs’ counsel a sum of money to settle one hundred percent of her
cases, tempts some clients to demand a higher payout in return for
consenting.122
Lump-sum settlements create an ultimatum game: If a claimant
(or enough claimants) rejects the settlement, then no one, including
the attorney, receives anything. But any attempt to solve this problem
by buying off the holdouts would violate the lawyer’s ethical obligations to her remaining clients.123 The temptation is so great, however,
that attorneys may attempt to achieve consensus by hook or by crook,
as was the case in the aggregate Kentucky Fen-Phen Settlement where
participating attorneys had to provide releases from “each and every”
fen-phen client.124 Kentucky lawyers William Gallion, Shirley
Cunningham, and Melbourne Mills had their staff contact their fen121 The infamous Kentucky Fen-Phen Settlement Agreement was one such provision.
See Gallion v. Ky. Bar Ass’n, 266 S.W.3d 802, 803–04 (Ky. 2008) (describing the distribution of the fen-phen settlement funds); Erichson, supra note 30, at 985 (noting that the
defendant “disavowed any responsibility for allocation of the settlement amount”); see
infra notes 124–26 and accompanying text (discussing the fen-phen litigation).
122 See Howard M. Erichson, A Typology of Aggregate Settlements, 80 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 1769, 1787–91 (2005) (discussing the different lump-sum settlement strategies defendants or defendants’ counsel use to settle cases); Charles Silver & Lynn A. Baker, Mass
Lawsuits and the Aggregate Settlement Rule, 32 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 733, 767 (1997)
(describing the negotiation environment under the unanimous consent requirement as one
where there are strong holdout incentives, instead advocating a majority rule); cf. Edelman
et al., supra note 29, at 99 (noting that because lawyers must pay referral or forwarding
fees for some clients, they have an incentive to misallocate in favor of those without fees
attached); Bruce L. Hay, The Theory of Fee Regulation in Class Action Settlements, 46 AM.
U. L. REV. 1429, 1472 (1997) (explaining why class counsel might be tempted to settle for a
less than optimal amount for their clients). But see Howard M. Erichson, Beyond the Class
Action: Lawyer Loyalty and Client Autonomy in Non-class Collective Representation, 2003
U. CHI. LEGAL F. 519, 573 (noting that though there is an incentive for plaintiffs to
demand a higher payoff, this provides the defendant with a powerful incentive to ensure
proper allocation of funds to get unanimous consent).
123 Erichson, supra note 30, at 1011.
124 Id. at 985–86 (quoting the Kentucky Fen-Phen Settlement Agreement); see also
Gallion, 266 S.W.3d at 803–04. The New York Fen-Phen Settlement by Napoli, Kaiser &
Bern was likewise subject to extensive ethical review and a judge ultimately concluded that
“a sufficient showing has been made that the Napoli Firm may have violated the
Disciplinary Rules and may have made material misrepresentations in the Letter and the
Form of Acceptance.” Appel-Hole v. Wyeth-Ayerst Labs. (In re N.Y. Diet Drug Litig.),
No. 700000/98, 2007 WL 969426, at *11 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Mar. 27, 2007).
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phen clients to tell each the amount of their respective settlement
awards. But, in violation of Model Rule of Professional Conduct
1.8(g), the lawyers never told their clients the full settlement amount,
how much money others would receive, how their settlement amounts
were determined, or that they could refuse the settlement and proceed
to trial.125 They offered their clients less than the total settlement
and pocketed the rest—fees well above their contingent-fee
arrangement.126
Though the practices described sound Grisham-esque,127 they
are all too real. Consider, for example, Johnson v. Nextel
Communications, Inc., where many of the practices just discussed
occurred in a single nonclass aggregation.128 In Johnson, a group of
587 clients retained a law firm to sue Nextel for employment discrimination. Instead of suing, the law firm allegedly entered into a dispute
resolution agreement with Nextel that included kickbacks for the
firm.129 Nextel would pay the plaintiffs’ firm $2 million to convince its
clients to abandon their legal claims and enter into an expedited mediation or arbitration procedure, an additional $3.5 million as clients’
claims were resolved, and $2 million more to work directly for
Nextel—the defendant—as a consultant for two years afterward.130
Moreover, if the attorneys could not quickly persuade their clients to
accept the settlement, then their fee award would be reduced on a
sliding-scale basis: the longer it took to achieve their clients’ consent,
the less their fee award.131 Without the consent of all 587 clients,
neither the clients nor the lawyers would have a right to receive anything.132 According to the Second Circuit, by entering into this agreement with the defendant, the plaintiffs’ law firm “violated its duty to
advise and represent each client individually, giving due consideration
to differing claims, differing strength of those claims, and differing
interests in one or more proper tribunals in which to assert those
claims.”133
125 Gallion, 266 S.W.3d at 803–04. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.8(g)
(2010) (requiring attorneys to inform clients involved in an aggregate settlement about not
only their settlement amount, but the amount that everyone else involved in the settlement
receives).
126 Erichson, supra note 30, at 986.
127 For example, Wally Figg’s antics, which included making false advertisement claims
for legal services, come readily to mind. JOHN GRISHAM, THE LITIGATORS 2–3 (2011).
128 660 F.3d 131 (2d Cir. 2011).
129 Id. at 134–35.
130 Id.
131 Id. at 139.
132 Id. at 140.
133 Id.
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Although Rule 23’s effectiveness in fashioning a judicial surrogate to protect absent class members is open to debate,134 when that
protective layer disappears altogether—as it does in nonclass aggregation—the problems metastasize. The agency problems remain, but the
judge no longer has clear authority to get involved and counsel’s ethical obligations to the group are muddied by traditional ethical rules
that assume individual client monitoring.135 Just as in class actions,
plaintiffs’ attorneys in nonclass aggregation face enormous pressure to
tender finality to the defendant: That is, after all, what ultimately dictates the lawsuit’s success. But the quest to achieve that finality
outside the well-traveled class-action path spurs unethical behavior.
And tying the lawyer’s payday to the settlement—as the contingent
fee does—only adds fuel to this fire. In short, this shift toward nonclass aggregation presents a striking need for someone, somehow, to
monitor the litigation and the attorneys on the plaintiffs’ behalf.
II
ALTERNATIVE LITIGATION FINANCING
The agency problems in aggregate litigation, the increased need
for nontraditional funding sources, and the lack of a viable monitor
portend a number of troublesome tradeoffs. In a near-perfect
world,136 each individual would be able to pursue the full value of her
claim—no matter how small—and perhaps even avoid the transaction
costs associated with attorneys’ fees. The plaintiff would be eminently
rational, swayed neither by the shrewd framing of settlement options,
by the press of mortgage payments or medical bills, nor by inexperience or informational asymmetries.137 But this is not the world we live
in. Rather, our world is one in which judges refuse to certify class
actions and drive the potentially wayward agent to either abandon the
134 See, e.g., William B. Rubenstein, The Fairness Hearing: Adversarial and Regulatory
Approaches, 53 UCLA L. REV. 1435, 1445 (2006) (observing that judges “suffer from a
remarkable informational deficit in the fairness-hearing process”); Adam S. Zimmerman &
David M. Jaros, The Criminal Class Action, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 1385, 1429-30 (2011)
(observing that “[c]ommentators have questioned the effectiveness of judicial review in
class action settlements,” but also noting that courts can demand that parties “explain the
complex trade-offs they have made in arriving at a settlement, and require a reasonable
decision-making process when they arrive at a distribution that affects restitution to
thousands of potential victims”).
135 See Johnson, 660 F.3d at 140 (“First, because [the plaintiffs’ firm] was not lead
counsel in a class action, the class-protective provisions of [Rule 23] were not triggered.”).
136 Obviously, in a perfect world, torts would not occur and people would honor their
contractual obligations without having to turn to the legal system for recourse.
137 See generally Adam S. Zimmerman, Funding Irrationality, 59 DUKE L.J. 1105,
1109–11 (2010) (describing the cognitive biases that affect plaintiffs’ settlement decisions in
large-scale litigation).
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endeavor altogether or to recruit and represent hundreds of roughly
similarly situated clients with little potential for establishing a meaningful attorney-client relationship.
Given this state of affairs, plaintiffs’ attorneys may increasingly
look to third-party financing to turn nonclass aggregation into a winning economic proposition. But this solution includes tradeoffs: the
financiers hoping to turn a profit off of others’ misfortune versus the
palpable need for continued access to the lawyers, to the courthouse,
and to justice; the questions about decisional control that pit paternalism against autonomy; and the ethical concerns raised when
someone other than the client has a say in the litigation versus the dire
need for attorney oversight. And these tradeoffs are but the tip of the
iceberg. Underlying each is a host of issues that range from the practical—whether clients can give informed consent to allow financiers to
share in their proceeds—to the convoluted, such as the myriad, mixed
incentives that result when a new entity enters into the already complex principal-agent dynamic explored above. Further still, these
knotty questions say nothing about what will become of cases in which
clients principally want declaratory or injunctive relief—cases that
third-party financiers have no incentive to fund. This Part begins to
untangle these issues by exploring the types of alternative litigation
financing presently available and tracing the incentives of financiers,
plaintiffs, and plaintiffs’ lawyers. Part III then considers whether
third-party financing might help alleviate the agency problems that
arise in aggregate litigation by shouldering litigation costs and providing a much needed monitor.
A. A Taxonomy of Third-Party Financing
Presently, there are three main types of third-party financing:
consumer legal funding, loans to plaintiffs’ law firms, and commercial
dispute funding—each of which raises distinct legal and ethical concerns. Third-party funding, or “alternative litigation financing,” began
in Australia, made its way to the United Kingdom, and took root in
the United States when companies started loaning money to cashstrapped plaintiffs who could not use their lawsuit as bank collateral,
but needed money for day-to-day expenses.138 This form of thirdparty financing, known as consumer legal funding, is a nonrecourse
138 Nate Raymond, More Attorneys Exploring Third-Party Litigation Funding, LAW.COM
(June 4, 2010), http://www.law.com/jsp/article.jsp?id=1202459195060&slreturn=1
(describing how third-party litigation migrated from Australia, to the United Kingdom, and
then to the United States). Australia does not allow contingency fees, but roughly five
investment firms fill the void. Susan Lorde Martin, Litigation Financing: Another Subprime
Industry That Has a Place in the United States Market, 53 VILL. L. REV. 83, 107 (2008).
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loan, meaning that a litigant would not need to pay back any more
than what she receives from the lawsuit. The plaintiff is not personally
liable—if she loses the suit, the lender loses the money.139 Given the
risk involved, interest rates can be quite high—between thirty-six and
one hundred and fifty percent per year—but the nonrecourse basis
enables funders to avoid state usury laws.140 Consumer legal funders
making cash advances to plaintiffs traditionally run up against historical maintenance doctrines, which prohibit third parties from assisting
a litigant in pursuing a lawsuit.141
Over time, a second type of financing emerged: Loaning money
to plaintiffs’ law firms, as opposed to cash-advance loans to plaintiffs
themselves, is a growing market within a niche practice. As of early
2010, only around nine companies provided loans to law firms, but as
of late 2011, that number had grown to around twelve.142 When financiers lend money to law firms, they secure those debts not by a single
case, but by all of the firm’s assets, including future fee awards from
other cases. Occasionally, funders will lend lawyers money based on a
trial verdict on appeal.143 Unlike a nonrecourse loan, plaintiffs’ firms
must repay the money regardless of whether they win or lose a partic139 STEVEN GARBER, RAND CORP., ALTERNATIVE LITIGATION FINANCING IN THE
UNITED STATES: ISSUES, KNOWNS, AND UNKNOWNS 9, 10 (2010); see also What Is Legal
Finance and Who Does It Help?, AM. LEGAL FIN. ASSOC., http://www.americanlegalfin.
com/alfa1/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=1Ia9qsxV0eQ%3d&tabid=71&mid=553 (last visited
Sept. 5, 2012) (explaining that member organizations fully accept the risk of cases being
won or lost and will not recover if the client does not recover).
140 Kirby Griffis, Follow the Money: Litigation Funders Back Your Foes,
METROPOLITAN CORP. COUNS., July 2011, at 1.
141 E.g., Osprey, Inc. v. Cabana Ltd. P’ship, 532 S.E.2d 269, 273 (S.C. 2000). For more
information on changes to current state laws, see Part III.D.1.
142 Steven Garber identified nine companies that loaned money to plaintiffs’ law firms
in early 2010: Advanced Legal Capital; Advocate Capital, Inc.; Counsel Financial;
Evergreen Funding Group; LawFinance Group, Inc.; Oxbridge Financial Group LLC;
Rapid Funds; RD Legal Capital; and ViaLegal Funding. GARBER, supra note 139, at 14.
Several other companies now exist, including Amicus Capital Services, LLC, BridgePoint
Financial Services, and LawsuitLoanHQ. See Disbursement Financing, BRIDGEPOINT FIN.
SERVS. INC., http://www.bpfin.com/disbursementfinancing (last visited Sept. 5, 2012)
(“[We] recognize[ ] that personal injury law firms are capital intensive businesses with
unique cash-flow cycles relative to other professional service providers.”); Law Firm
Loans, AMICUS CAPITAL SERVS., http://www.amicuscapitalservices.com/law-firmloans.html (last visited Sept. 5, 2012) (“We offer loans secured by your portfolio of cases,
for four to five times more money than a traditional bank could offer.”); Litigation
Financing, LAWSUITLOANHQ, http://lawsuitloanhq.com/plaintiff-case-costs.htm (last visited Sept. 5, 2012) (“We are experts in legal finance, lawsuit loans, law firm cash-flow
financing, attorney funding, law firm loans and legal practice line of credit.”).
143 Alison Frankel, Helping Underfunded Plaintiffs Lawyers—At a Price, LAW.COM
(Feb. 13, 2006), http://www.law.com/jsp/law/international/LawArticleFriendlyIntl.jsp?id=
900005547685.
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ular case.144 Such was the case in the Ground Zero workers’ litigation:
Napoli Bern had to reimburse Counsel Financial regardless of the
case’s outcome.145 Interest rates are significantly higher than what a
bank might charge for a loan based on traditional assets—rates tend
to be “north of 20 percent,” making these loans unattractive to wellfinanced firms.146 Still, lenders in this area fill a need that banks do
not: Banks loan money based on traditional assets and collateral, not
on potential winnings.147
Finally, a burgeoning market of around seven lenders provides
money directly to businesses to finance commercial, business-versusbusiness disputes in exchange for either a percentage of the plaintiff’s
eventual recovery or a multiple of the supplied capital.148 Those percentages range from thirty-five to sixty-seven percent of the lawsuit’s
recovery.149 This kind of lending may run into historical prohibitions
on champerty, a form of maintenance where the lender receives an
interest in the suit’s outcome.150 Two of the lenders in this area,
Juridica Investments and Burford Capital, Ltd., are publicly traded
companies in the Alternative Investment Market on the London
Stock Exchange. They principally bankroll international arbitrations,
intellectual property, breach of contract, and antitrust disputes.151
144

GARBER, supra note 139, at 9–10.
Goldstein & Edelman, supra note 14.
146 Frankel, supra note 143.
147 As LawFinance prominently explains in its slogan, “We Do What Banks Won’t,”
LAWFINANCE GRP., http://www.lawfinance.com/ (last visited Sept. 5, 2012).
148 See GARBER, supra note 139, at 13–15 (noting such lenders as ARCA Capital,
Burford Capital, Calunius Capital, IMF, Juridica Investments, and Juris Capital);
Hamerman, supra note 62, at 17 (noting that Juridica’s clients are primarily Fortune 500
companies, large universities, and law firms); Vanessa O’Connell, Funds Spring Up To
Invest in High-Stakes Litigation, WALL ST. J., Oct. 3, 2011, at B1 (“At least three start-up
business are entering the fledgling ‘alternative litigation funding’ market this year, creating
funds that will invest at least a few million dollars in a case in exchange for a share of the
lawsuit’s winnings, which can be in the several-million-dollar or even billion-dollar
range.”); BLACKROBE CAPITAL, http://www.blackrobecapital.com (last visited Sept. 5,
2012) (noting that BlackRobe Capital was founded, in part, by Tim Scrantom, who also
began Juridica).
149 Raymond, supra note 138.
150 See Osprey, Inc. v. Cabana Ltd. P’ship, 532 S.E.2d 269, 273 (S.C. 2000) (“[P]ut
simply, maintenance is helping another prosecute a suit; champerty is maintaining a suit in
return for a financial interest in the outcome; and barratry is a continuing practice of maintenance or champerty.” (quoting In re Primus, 436 U.S. 412, 424 n.15 (1978))). For more
information on current changes to states’ champerty laws, see Part III.D.1.
151 See GARBER, supra note 139, at 13; Hamerman, supra note 62; Raymond, supra note
138; Submission from Burford Grp. LLC, Paper Concerning Alternative Litigation
Financing 2 (Feb. 15, 2011), available at http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/
migrated/2011_build/ethics_2020/comments_on_alternative_litigation_financing_issues_
paper.authcheckdam.pdf (“Burford Group carries on its activities in the United States
through its subsidiary, Burford Group LLC.”).
145
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Most commercial dispute lenders currently steer clear of funding
aggregate litigation and leave those investments to funders who loan
money to plaintiffs’ law firms. But, as the following sections explore,
this model of contracting with the plaintiffs for a portion of their proceeds has the most potential for creating a workable monitor in large
scale, multidistrict litigations.152 And for those investors or commercial dispute lenders seeking a longer-term investment with a potentially exponential payoff, funding aggregate litigation is their logical
next step.
B. Mixed Litigation and Investment Incentives
Finding a viable intermediary entails paying careful attention to
financiers’ incentives and the ways in which those incentives dovetail
with plaintiffs’ aims and public-enforcement goals. These interests
hinge on litigation’s two primary functions: (1) resolving disputes and
(2) preventing disputes by defining, shaping, and clarifying the law to
make behavioral modification and compliance possible.153 Preventing
disputes relies on litigants to push, shape, and define legal ambiguities
through arguments and establishing precedent. Yet, there may be a
conflict between dispute-resolution goals and deterrence aims: If a
settlement offer is generous enough to buy a plaintiff off, she has little
incentive not to accept it and push for further judicial rulings and
appeals.154 Repeat players, however, like nonprofit groups, attorneys,
funders, and defendants, have at least some impetus to invest in setting precedent and clarifying laws.155 Although funders are repeat
players, many would prefer a quick settlement and an expeditious
investment return.
The following sections analyzes the incentives and biases of plaintiffs’ attorneys, the plaintiffs themselves, and third-party financiers.
Part III then considers how mixing these incentives by allowing financiers to fund aggregate litigation could change and distort them. Note
152 In fact, Burford Capital, Ltd. is currently funding the Ecuadorian personal injury
litigation against Chevron, which involves thousands of plaintiffs. Hurley, supra note 15.
James Tyrrell, Jr., the Ecuadorian plaintiffs’ attorney, also acts as outside counsel to both
Burford and Juridica. Raymond, supra note 138.
153 See generally Robert G. Bone, Lon Fuller’s Theory of Adjudication and the False
Dichotomy Between Dispute Resolution and Public Law Models of Litigation, 75 B.U. L.
REV. 1273, 1279–82 (1995) (discussing litigation’s dual functions).
154 See David Luban, Settlements and the Erosion of the Public Realm, 83 GEO. L.J.
2619, 2623 (1995) (noting that private parties often have an inadequate incentive to create
precedent); Richard H. McAdams, The Expressive Power of Adjudication, 2005 U. ILL. L.
REV. 1043, 1114 (observing that disputants have “insufficient incentive to care about the
precedential effect on future disputes in which they are not participants”).
155 KRITZER, supra note 78, at 16; Maya Steinitz, Whose Claim Is This Anyway? ThirdParty Litigation Funding, 95 MINN. L. REV. 1268, 1312–18 (2011).
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too that special ethical issues may arise on the very rare occasion
when the plaintiffs’ attorney is also an investor in or affiliated with the
third-party funder.156
1. Plaintiffs’ Attorneys’ Incentives
Plaintiffs’ attorneys, like the plaintiffs themselves, are vulnerable
to decision-making biases. The principal-agent literature explored in
Part I.B exposes the basic economic problem and discusses attorneys’
financial interests, but only partially explains attorneys’ incentives and
bias toward self-interest. Although lawyers are less subject to contrast
biases and emotional tugs than plaintiffs are,157 they are not always
solely motivated by financial calculations. As repeat players, attorneys’ reputations among the plaintiffs’ bar, defense attorneys, and clients are important for obtaining referrals, maintaining credible
threats, encouraging repeat business, and achieving favorable settlements.158 An attorney’s reputation may thus function as an economic
control on potential self-dealing and collusive or quick-pay settlements.159 Likewise, settlement quality is heavily intertwined with the
lawyer’s reputation and her ability to pose a plausible threat to defendants through accepting meritorious cases, having the resources available for case preparation and trial, and making justifiable settlement
demands.160
Having the resources to win favorable settlements and craft a
reputation as a serious attorney who provides those results is far more
difficult in the current economic climate.161 Consequently, plaintiffs’
attorneys are more likely to turn to nontraditional funding sources for
four reasons.
First, recall that the fixed costs of aggregate litigation, as opposed
to a class action, are likely to increase substantially.162 Not only must
lawyers spend the same limited resources on developing generic assets
like scientific research and expert analysis, they must also pour money
156 For some guidance on these issues, see ABA COMM’N ON ETHICS 20/20, WHITE
PAPER ON ALTERNATIVE LITIGATION FINANCE 17–20 (2011) (draft), available at http://
www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/ethics_2020/20111019_draft_alf_
white_paper_posting.authcheckdam.pdf; and MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R.
1.7(a)(2), 1.8(e), 1.8(i) (2010).
157 See infra Part II.B.2 (discussing plaintiffs’ contrast bias).
158 KRITZER, supra note 78, at 232–39.
159 Id. at 221–22; Korobkin & Guthrie, Psychology, supra note 8, at 123.
160 KRITZER, supra note 78, at 242.
161 See Alexa Hyland, Firms Make Case for Legal Loans: Companies See Profit in
Funding Contingency Suits, L.A. BUS. J., Apr. 21, 2008, available at 2008 WL 25525068
(noting that it is more difficult to obtain traditional financing from banks).
162 See supra Part I.A.
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into advertising, client recruitment, client counseling, filing fees, and
the administrative costs of keeping up with each client’s documents.
Second, because plaintiffs’ attorneys must either work on a contingent-fee basis or prevail before the judge awards them fees under a
fee-shifting statute, they frequently encounter cash-flow problems.
These problems can bring them close to insolvency and impact their
ability to accept new cases, invest sufficient resources in current cases,
and compete with more established law firms.163 Cash-flow problems
likewise undermine attorneys’ ability to pose a credible threat to the
defendant, which usually has far more resources than the plaintiffs
and can leverage its superior economic position in hopes of pressuring
plaintiffs to accept a low-ball offer.164
Third, the economic downturn and tightened lending standards
have all but dried up traditional funding sources like banks,165 which
drive the ever-entrepreneurial and creative lawyer to seek nontraditional funding. Finally, even the financially solvent firm might seek
alternative funding to fortify its threat to the defendant. Because
funders conduct their own due diligence to assess the case’s merits, if
funding is disclosed, it sends both parties an additional signal about
the value of plaintiffs’ claims.166
2. Plaintiffs’ Incentives
Nonclass aggregation adds a new wrinkle in evaluating plaintiffs’
litigation aims. In class actions, dealing with plaintiffs who are largely
absent and typically disinterested is a much simpler proposition than
managing hundreds or thousands of clients whose individual goals do
not always align with each others’ or their attorneys’.167 Plaintiffs’
motivations and incentives for litigating do not fit easily within a
single box. Consider a few examples: A woman paralyzed in a rollover
163

GARBER, supra note 139, at 23.
See generally NAGAREDA, supra note 48, at 14–15 (discussing the need for ample
funds for plaintiffs to create a credible threat to defendants).
165 Hyland, supra note 161.
166 See GARBER, supra note 139, at 24, 32–33 (observing that “a defendant who knows
that the plaintiff has ALF may infer . . . that the legal claim has legal merit or high economic value”); Telis Demos, Cashing In on Litigation, FORTUNE, May 4, 2009 (noting that
shares had gone up twenty percent since the launch of a lawsuit by a hedge fund supported
by Juridica); Max Schanzenbach & David Dana, How Would Third Party Financing
Change the Face of American Tort Litigation? The Role of Agency Costs in the AttorneyClient Relationship 12 (Sept. 14, 2009), available at http://www.law.northwestern.edu/
searlecenter/papers/Schanzenbach_Agency%20Costs.pdf. As Garber suggests, this is far
from a straightforward proposition and it raises substantial questions for game theorists.
GARBER, supra note 139, at 33 n.29.
167 For more information on why plaintiffs in aggregate litigation might be more or less
interested, see Burch, Litigating Together, supra note 87, at 99–100.
164
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accident demanded that Ford and Firestone broadcast a videotaped
apology before she would settle; Paula Jones demanded (but never
received) an apology from President Clinton; and many of the
September 11 victims wanted information about the facts and circumstances, to hold those responsible accountable, to publicly condemn
wrongdoing, and to take action that would promote change.168
When asked why they litigated, many plaintiffs with tort claims
such as medical injuries insisted that they were litigating on principle,
not for the money.169 Plaintiffs litigate to establish precedent, express
their feelings, have the defendant admit fault and responsibility,
ensure that the event will never happen again, reveal cover-ups, discover answers, punish or gain retribution, receive an apology, obtain
dignity and respect post-injury, and be heard.170 Consequently, as Part
III.E explores, financially motivated third-party financiers may not be
the right solution for all plaintiffs, though plaintiffs’ attorneys working
on a contingency fee have long monetized all of these claims.
Plaintiffs may not act rationally when deciding whether and
under what terms to settle. In making settlement decisions, plaintiffs
may fall prey to (1) contrast bias, (2) tendencies toward risk aversion,
and (3) group decision-making biases, such as confirmation bias and
group polarization.
First, contrast bias affects the way that plaintiffs evaluate settlement options depending on what other options are offered to them
168 See Erin Ann O’Hara & Douglas Yarn, On Apology and Consilience, 77 WASH. L.
REV. 1121, 1125 (2002) (discussing the apology demanded by the paralyzed women and
Paula Jones); Gillian K. Hadfield, Framing the Choice Between Cash and the Courthouse:
Experiences with the 9/11 Victim Compensation Fund, 42 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 645, 649
(2008) (discussing the September 11 victims’ thoughts on litigation).
169 See Tamara Relis, “It’s Not About the Money!”: A Theory of Misconceptions of
Plaintiffs’ Litigation Aims, 68 U. PITT. L. REV. 341, 378–79 (2007).
170 Id. at 361-63 & fig.4. Other studies confirm these results. E.g., Randall P. Bezanson,
The Libel Suit in Retrospect: What Plaintiffs Want and What Plaintiffs Get, 74 CALIF. L.
REV. 789, 799–800 (1986); Marc Galanter, Adjudication, Litigation, and Related
Phenomena, in LAW AND THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 151, 191–92 (Leon Lipson & Stanton
Wheeler eds., 1986); Marc Galanter, Reading the Landscape of Disputes: What We Know
and Don’t Know (and Think We Know) About Our Allegedly Contentious and Litigious
Society, 31 UCLA L. REV. 4, 30–31 (1983); Deborah R. Hensler, Resolving Mass Toxic
Torts: Myths and Realities, 1989 U. ILL. L. REV. 89, 99 & tbl.6; E. Allan Lind et al., In the
Eye of the Beholder: Tort Litigants’ Evaluations of Their Experiences in the Civil Justice
System, 24 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 953, 965–67 (1990); Sally Engle Merry & Susan S. Silbey,
What Do Plaintiffs Want? Reexamining the Concept of Dispute, 9 JUST. SYS. J. 151, 153
(1984); O’Hara & Yarn, supra note 168, at 1125; Tom R. Tyler, A Psychological Perspective
on the Settlement of Mass Tort Claims, 53 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 199, 204 (1990). But
see RICHARD LEMPERT & JOSEPH SANDERS, AN INVITATION TO LAW AND SOCIAL
SCIENCE 175 (1986) (concluding that plaintiffs other than those involved in discrimination
lawsuits are principally concerned about economic well-being).
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simultaneously and how many choices they have.171 For instance,
people tend to decide more quickly if a settlement offer includes only
a single option as opposed to an offer containing two attractive
choices, regardless of whether both options leave the decision maker
better off. Additionally, including a third, inferior option makes an
already available choice appear even more attractive than it otherwise
would.172 Although frank legal advice diminishes this bias,173 the circumstances of large-scale aggregation make candid, complete advice
unlikely.174 Aggregated clients have attenuated relationships with
their attorneys and lawyers’ self-interest as financiers may color their
substantive advice.175
Second, risk preferences may affect plaintiffs’ decision making in
ways that differ from the risk preferences of their attorneys or thirdparty financiers. Research shows that cognitive psychological factors
like framing,176 anchoring (based on initial settlement offers), and
equity seeking177 affect plaintiffs’ risk preferences more so than they

171 For examples of studies demonstrating the existence of contrast bias, see Mark
Kelman et al., Context-Dependent in Legal Decision Making, 25 J. LEGAL STUD. 287, 297300 (1996); Russell Korobkin & Chris Guthrie, Psychological Barriers to Litigation
Settlement: An Experimental Approach, 9 MICH. L. REV. 107, 129-42 (1994) [hereinafter
Korobkin & Guthrie, Psychological Barriers]; and Zimmerman, supra note 137, at 1142-49.
172 For demonstrations of contrast bias and framing effects, see DAN ARIELY,
PREDICTABLY IRRATIONAL: THE HIDDEN FORCES THAT SHAPE OUR DECISIONS 8–10
(2008); Chris Guthrie, Panacea or Pandora’s Box?: The Costs of Options in Negotiation, 88
IOWA L. REV. 601, 619 (2003); Zimmerman, supra note 137, at 1143-45; see also Ravi Dhar,
Consumer Preference for a No-Choice Option, 24 J. CONSUMER RES. 215, 229 (1997); Joel
Huber, John W. Payne & Christopher Puto, Adding Asymmetrically Dominated
Alternatives: Violations of Regularity and the Similarity Hypothesis, 9 J. CONSUMER RES.
90, 94 (1982); Sanjay Mishra, U.N. Umesh & Donald E. Stem, Jr., Antecedents of the
Attraction Effect: An Information-Processing Approach, 30 J. MARKETING RES. 331,
332–35 (1993); Simone Moran & Joachim Meyer, Using Context Effects To Increase a
Leader’s Advantage: What Set of Alternatives Should Be Included in the Comparison Set?,
23 INT’L J. RES. MARKETING 141 (2006); Eldar Shafir, Itamar Simonson & Amos Tversky,
Reason-Based Choice, in CHOICES, VALUES, AND FRAMES 607-08 (Daniel Kahneman &
Amos Tversky eds., 2000).
173 See Korobkin & Guthrie, Psychology, supra note 8, at 82 (noting how lawyers have
the ability to persuade clients to settle); Zimmerman, supra note 137, at 1146 (noting that
legal advice can reduce biases).
174 See supra Part I.B.
175 Zimmerman, supra note 137, at 1146 n.186; see generally Korobkin & Guthrie,
Psychology, supra note 8, at 124.
176 See Korobkin & Guthrie, Psychological Barriers, supra note 171, at 109, 129–31
(“People avoid risk when they choose between options they understand as gains, but they
prefer risk when they select between choices viewed as losses.”).
177 See id. at 109 (“People want what they are legally entitled to, but they also want
recognition of their claim’s validity.”).
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do their attorneys’.178 In contrast, their attorneys’ desire to settle is
likely animated principally by financial calculations.179 Because trial is
particularly expensive for a contingent-fee lawyer, she is likely to
favor settlement more often than her clients, who may be more
affected by contrast bias, anchoring, or nonmonetary motivations.180
Disparate risk preferences also mean that settlements may not reflect
the merits so much as the plaintiff’s (or her attorney’s) risk tolerance.181 This can result in suboptimal deterrence for defendants who
take calculated financial risks, thereby undermining one of litigation’s
public functions.
Risk preferences are likewise affected by how much money is at
stake compared to a person’s overall wealth: People tend to be more
willing risk takers when less money is in play.182 This so-called “peanuts effect,” where people take risks when playing for “peanuts,” suggests that interested parties with less at stake will be less risk averse
when litigating.183 So, in a negative-value case like a consumer suit,
the contingent-fee lawyer with a substantial stake in the whole litigation is likely more risk averse than her clients. But, when the stakes
are higher—as in personal injury or product liability cases—risk preferences may align between the lawyer and the client. A middle-class
plaintiff with a claim worth a few hundred thousand dollars, a contingent-fee attorney, and even a third-party financier with a substantial
investment in the case’s outcome may all be similarly risk averse. But
a plaintiff who litigates for nonmonetary reasons, like revealing coverups or wanting to punish the defendant, may have a higher risk toler178 See Korobkin & Guthrie, Psychology, supra note 8, at 124 (finding that attorneys
evaluate litigation choices differently from their clients); Korobkin & Guthrie,
Psychological Barriers, supra note 171, at 111 (same).
179 See Korobkin & Guthrie, Psychology, supra note 8, at 124 (predicting that financial
considerations are more likely to influence lawyers than litigants in making settlement
decisions).
180 See id. at 122–23 (discussing the effect of contingent-fee arrangements on lawyers’
incentives to settle).
181 See Molot, supra note 18, at 70 (describing how differences in the parties’ risk preferences may influence their attitudes toward settlement).
182 See Harry Markowitz, The Utility of Wealth, 60 J. POL. ECON. 151, 151–52 (1952)
(describing a hypothesis that links a person’s level of wealth with his risk preferences);
Drazen Prelec & George Lowenstein, Decision Making over Time and Under Uncertainty:
A Common Approach, 37 MGMT. SCI. 770, 774 (1991) (explaining how the magnitude of a
choice’s outcome influences a person’s risk preferences); Bethany J. Weber & Gretchen B.
Chapman, Playing for Peanuts: Why Is Risk Seeking More Common for Low-Stakes
Gambles?, 97 ORG. BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 31, 31–33 (2005) (discussing
how risk preferences vary depending on the amount of money at stake).
183 Michael Gousgounis, Association-Driven Aggregate Litigation: Peanuts Effect and
Democratization of Litigation Governance 5 (May 1, 2009) (unpublished manuscript),
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1469046.
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ance. The same might be true for a lawyer for whom a particular lawsuit is as much about creating or maintaining a certain reputation (say,
for large settlements or jury awards) as it is about a specific fee.184
Third, the risk-seeking versus risk-avoiding dynamic changes further when decision making is no longer an individual endeavor, but
requires group consensus—as is frequently the case in aggregate litigation. As I have explored in the past, interpersonal group dynamics
require heightened sensitivity to the decision-making process as part
and parcel of litigation procedures.185 As plaintiffs participate and
deliberate in group governance, they tend to influence one another’s
decisions, for better or worse. If group norms stifle dissent among
homogenous group members, then members’ convictions can make
them discount contrary evidence (confirmation bias) or move toward
extreme positions (group polarization).186 Cohesive groups, however,
might incur moral obligations of solidarity and loyalty to one another,
which means that they may ultimately push for a settlement that is in
the best interests of the group as a whole.187 So long as the cohesive
group incorporates diverse viewpoints (such as those of their attorneys, other plaintiff groups, or a third-party financier) into their dis-

184 See KRITZER, supra note 78, at 219–22 (discussing the importance of reputation for
contingent-fee lawyers).
185 See, e.g., Burch, Litigating Together, supra note 87; Elizabeth Chamblee Burch,
Group Consensus, Individual Consent, 79 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 506 (2010) [hereinafter
Burch, Group Consensus]; Elizabeth Chamblee Burch, Litigating Groups, 61 ALA. L. REV.
1 (2009). I do not mean that litigation is truncated in terms of time to settlement, but that
aggregate litigation lacks the traditional progression toward trial that an individual litigant
might experience.
186 Elizabeth Chamblee Burch, Optimal Lead Plaintiffs, 64 VAND. L. REV. 1109,
1152–54 (2011); Stefan Schulz-Hardt et al., Biased Information Search in Group Decision
Making, 78 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 655, 656–59 (2000); see also Dieter Frey,
Recent Research on Selective Exposure to Information, in 19 ADVANCES IN EXPERIMENTAL
SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 41, 52–53 (Leonard Berkowitz ed., 1986) (describing studies showing
that people prefer information that is consonant with their own attitudes); Joshua
Klayman, Varieties of Confirmation Bias, in DECISION MAKING FROM A COGNITIVE
PERSPECTIVE 385, 385–87, 398 (Jerome Busemeyer, Reid Hastie & Douglas L. Medin, eds.
1995) (discussing several kinds of confirmation biases, and the connection between evidence interpretation and bias); Raymond S. Nickerson, Confirmation Bias: A Ubiquitous
Phenomenon in Many Guises, 2 REV. GEN. PSYCHOL. 175, 178, 210 (1998) (summarizing
studies indicating that people give greater weight to evidence supporting their beliefs, and
discussing how confirmation biases may compound the effects of making inadequately
informed decisions).
187 See Burch, Group Consensus, supra note 185, at 519–23 (describing how solidarity
and loyalty may develop among a group of plaintiffs, and how those notions may affect the
group’s dynamics).
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cussion and decision-making processes, they can avoid group decisionmaking’s most detrimental effects.188
3. Financiers’ Incentives
Financiers’ investment incentives are relatively simple: They want
to make money and are willing to take significant risks for significant
returns, at least so long as they do not exhaust their capital along the
way.189 That simple incentive, however, belies the complexity that animates it. Take settlement, for example: Commercial-claims lenders
tend to invest in lawsuits that may settle quickly so they can collect
their share and move on to other ventures. But funders who loan
money to plaintiffs’ law firms or to plaintiffs themselves based on
hefty annual interest rates may want to delay settlement to increase
those charges.190 And no lender is concerned with equitable or injunctive relief.
Incentives vary depending on the investment and the investment
strategy. For example, financiers backing commercial, businessdispute claims will have incentives that differ from those who loan
money to plaintiffs’ law firms. When investors bankroll commercial,
business-versus-business claims in exchange for a share of the eventual recovery, they tend to avoid cases that involve novel legal questions or that could end up in a jury trial.191 Juries inject too much
188 See Burch, Litigating Together, supra note 87, at 117–23 (discussing the use of special
officers and the encouragement of communication among plaintiffs as methods of promoting cooperation).
189 See GARBER, supra note 139, at 24 (explaining the costs that alternative litigation
financing companies face and the risks they are willing to accept).
190 See generally Terry Carter, Cash Up Front: New Funding Sources Ease Financial
Strains on Plaintiffs Lawyers, ABA JOURNAL (Oct. 8, 2004, 1:31 AM), http://
www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/cash_up_front (“[C]ash advances go to plaintiffs
before trial or settlement, with monthly interest rates ranging from 2 percent to 4 percent
in some states to . . . as high as 15 percent in Nevada. These rates sometimes are compounded and can approach 200 percent annually.”); Ben Hallman, Influential N.Y. Ethics
Panel Cautions Lawyers on Dealing with Lawsuit Funding Companies, CTR. FOR PUB.
INTEGRITY (June 16, 2011, 5:38 PM), http://www.iwatchnews.org/2011/06/16/4935/impactinfluential-ny-ethics-panel-cautions-lawyers-dealings-lawsuit-funding. But see William J.
Gorta, Bitten by Lawsuit ‘Sharks,’ N.Y. POST, Dec. 12, 2011, http://www.nypost.com/p/
news/local/brooklyn/bitten_by_lawsuit_sharks_50H1EYevFanwCmIFBzgsWM (describing
a $4000 loan that morphed into $116,000 with interest and fees; before settlement, the
judge threatened to rule that the practice was usurious and unconscionable). As the preceding citation shows, even consumer funders might prefer to receive a quick turnaround
on their investment.
191 See Jonathan D. Glater, Investing in a Portfolio of Lawsuits, for a Share of the
Awards, N.Y. TIMES, June 3, 2009, at B1 (interviewing Richard Fields, the CEO of Juridica
Capital Management, who describes how Juridica selects cases). Both Juridica and Burford
Capital, Ltd. invest in commercial disputes. See Raymond, supra note 138.
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uncertainty into the process, as do politically charged cases.192 For
similar reasons, these investors avoid cases likely to be appealed or
where the opposing party lacks deep pockets.193
Richard Fields, the CEO of Juridica Capital Management, a company that trades on the London Stock Exchange but invests mostly in
commercial claims within the United States, explained that his company funded only seventeen out of 122 potential cases last year.194
Selecting cases involved a “two-month due diligence process that
examine[d] credit risk, potential profit and expenditure, defendants’
financial status and other players involved in the case.”195 Juridica
spreads investments across substantive areas, such as intellectual
property, price-fixing, and shareholder disputes. Fields noted that
“90% of cases [were] settled without a lengthy trial or resolved
through motions,” which allowed “for a quick turnaround on profit
when the right case [was] selected.”196 Commercial-claims lenders
hope that the pickiness with which they conduct their due diligence
and their selectivity will “send[ ] a powerful message to the opposing
side with respect to the likely outcomes, thus encouraging settlements.”197 Consequently, they accept cases with quality lawyers who
have a proven success rate.
When lenders loan plaintiffs’ law firms money, however, their
incentives align more with the law firm than the client. Because
recourse loans are secured by all of the law firm’s assets, financiers’
due diligence concentrates less on the particulars of any one case and
more on the firm’s portfolio of cases and overall financial stability.198
Of course, law firms that heavily invest in a particular type of aggregate litigation (say, Accutane, Vioxx, or Zyprexa) would be different.
192 See Glater, supra note 191, at B1 (reporting that the managing director of a Chicago
financier holds these views).
193 See id. (reporting that Juridica follows this strategy). See also Hamerman, supra note
62, at 17 (quoting Mark Wells, CEO of Calunius Capital, as saying: “Litigation could take
many years and if, at the end of it, you’re facing a company that hasn’t got the assets to
meet the claim, it’s not very attractive.”).
194 Lauren Tara LaCapra, Hedge Fund Hell: These Funds Sue You, THE STREET (Jan.
23, 2009, 10:01 AM), http://www.thestreet.com/story/10459369/1/hedge-fund-hell-thesefunds-sue-you.html?puc=_tscrss.
195 Id.; see also Burford Grp. LLC, supra note 151, at 5 (“Burford does extensive due
diligence before financing a matter.”).
196 LaCapra, supra note 194.
197 Inst. of Mgmt. & Admin., Litigation Funding Services Enter United States, 2009 L.
FIRM MGMT.; see also Melissa Maleske, Hedging Bets: Third-Party Litigation Funding
Gains Steam in the U.S., INSIDE COUNS. (Dec. 1, 2009), http://www.insidecounsel.com/2009/
12/01/hedging-bets (discussing the selectivity with which lenders select cases).
198 See Frankel, supra note 143 (interviewing Gary Chodes, the CEO of Oasis Legal
Finance Group, Michael Blum, the CEO and co-founder of LawFinance, and Paul Myers,
the president of Advocate Capital, who discuss how they select cases).
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Investing in a firm like Napoli Bern, which had substantial capital tied
up in one principal case with many clients—the Ground Zero
workers—would require risk assessments more akin to those conducted by Richard Fields of Juridica. As a New York Times reporter
and a reporter for the Center on Public Integrity explain:
Lenders employ experienced lawyers to judge the strength of cases.
They consult databases showing the results of similar lawsuits, just
as appraisers value homes based on recent sales. A corporate defendant may have a history of battling personal injury claims; or juries
in a specific county may have a history of siding with local
employers. Then they place their bets. Counsel [Financial] will
invest up to $10 million in a law firm.199

For instance, before Oxbridge Financial Group arranged for
Stillwater Capital Partners to loan money to Jared Woodfill for his
lawsuits against BNSF Railway, the group “spent several months
reviewing the cases” and sent “lawyers to Texas to look at documents
and to question Woodfill and his partners.”200 Because law firms are
liable regardless of the case’s outcome, they have more incentive to
negotiate lower interest rates.201 Even so, Stillwater Capital Partners
charges Woodfill around sixteen percent annual interest and Counsel
Financial generally charges eighteen percent, significantly less than
what consumer funders charge plaintiffs.202
Consumer funders, who dispense nonrecourse loans to plaintiffs
and thus risk losing money if the plaintiff loses the case, must also
carefully evaluate a case’s merits before funding it.203 The danger,
however, is that the plaintiff—knowing that she will be required to
repay a minimum amount plus a percentage of the settlement—may
refuse an otherwise reasonable offer and continue to trial. In one oftcited case, a plaintiff borrowed $200,000 in exchange for agreeing to
pay $600,000 plus “a large percentage of any future recovery,” which
199

Ben Hallman & Binyamin Appelbaum, Betting on Justice: Borrowing To Sue, CTR.
PUB. INTEGRITY (Nov. 15, 2010, 2:39 AM), http://www.publicintegrity.org/2010/11/15/
2320/betting-justice-borrowing-sue.
200 Id.
201 See Goldstein & Edelman, supra note 14 (quoting a source familiar with the Ground
Zero workers’ suit against New York City, who observed that plaintiffs’ counsel had borrowed money to finance the litigation and would have to repay the loans themselves if they
lost the lawsuit).
202 Hallman & Appelbaum, supra note 199; see also Frankel, supra note 143 (reporting
that consumer funder Oasis will charge a plaintiff thirty-seven percent interest on a nonrecourse loan).
203 See Frankel, supra note 143 (interviewing corporate officers of consumer funder
firms, who discuss their case selection and evaluation methods); LAWMAX LEGAL FINANCE,
http://www.fundmycase.com/en/attorney_info.php4 (last visited Sept. 5, 2012) (explaining
that requirements for receiving funding include compelling liability, a defendant’s ability to
pay, and documented damages).
FOR
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led her to reason that proceeding to trial and losing would be a net
gain unless a settlement offer exceeded $1.2 million.204 She ultimately
rejected a million-dollar settlement offer and revealed her rationale to
her attorneys after trial. Her attorneys then sued the lender for fraud,
unfair and deceptive trade practices, and tortious interference with
their contingent-fee agreement.205
Well aware of these risks, consumer funders aim to allot plaintiffs
the ideal amount of money. As Dennis Shields, the president of
LawCash, explains, “We want to give them enough money but also
keep it on a tight rope,” since a substantial advance could lead plaintiffs to decline early (but fair) settlements and take their chances at
trial.206 Likewise, too little money could lead plaintiffs to settle
early—for many of the reasons that Owen Fiss identifies in Against
Settlement—which would also decrease the funder’s cut.207
Because procedural rules and substantive laws dictate monetary
recovery (and thus the return on a third-party funder’s investment),
some financiers have reason to execute strategies that will change
those rules and laws in ways that promote recovery.208 After all, like
plaintiffs’ and defense attorneys, they are repeat players. But whether
a financier attempts to change these rules depends on the funder’s
investment strategy. If the strategy is to diversify its portfolio across
substantive areas, as Richard Fields suggests is the case for commercial lenders, then there is less incentive to invest in rule changes.209
Commercial lenders seeking a quick profit are likely to accept cases
that avoid the protracted appeals that attempted rule changes may
entail. In that way, they differ vastly from plaintiffs’ attorneys, some
of whom have invested huge amounts of capital to promote legislation
and set precedent in the asbestos and tobacco litigations.210
204 See Weaver, Bennett & Bland, P.A. v. Speedy Bucks, Inc., 162 F. Supp. 2d 448, 451
(W.D.N.C. 2001) (discussing the proposed settlement).
205 Id. at 451–54; Weaver, Bennett & Bland, P.A. v. Speedy Bucks, Inc., No. 1:00CV249,
2007 WL 2344820, at *1 (W.D.N.C. Aug. 14, 2007) (granting in part and denying in part
plaintiff’s motion for attorneys’ fees and costs).
206 Carter, supra note 190.
207 Owen M. Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073, 1076–77 (1984) (explaining the
ways in which resource disparities can influence settlement for economically disadvantaged
plaintiffs); see also Carter, supra note 190 (explaining that “a small cash advance might
encourage plaintiffs to settle early for too little”).
208 See Steinitz, supra note 155, at 1312 (observing that litigation funders may have
incentives to invest in changing the rules because they frequently invest in certain types of
litigation).
209 See supra notes 194–97 and accompanying text.
210 See Richard P. Ieyoub & Theodore Eisenberg, State Attorney General Actions, the
Tobacco Litigation, and the Doctrine of Parens Patriae, 74 TUL. L. REV. 1859, 1860-62
(2000) (discussing the domino effect of multiple ongoing litigations against the tobacco
industry, and how it “opened access to tobacco industry documents”).
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Finally, financiers’ fiduciary obligations run not to plaintiffs, as an
attorney’s duties do, but to their backers or shareholders.211 Although
news accounts suggest that these backers are often passive and do not
know where their money goes,212 these fiduciary obligations may
cause financiers to pressure plaintiffs to settle early, so that they can
report higher quarterly profits.213 Publicly traded companies are particularly likely to exert such pressure.

FINANCIERS

III
INTERMEDIARIES

AS

Layering a financier’s incentives atop an already complex principal-agent relationship can fundamentally alter litigation and settlement dynamics. An investor who bankrolls a plaintiffs’ law firm on a
recourse basis and accrues monthly interest may care little about
speedy settlements, so long as the law firm’s financial solvency is not
in doubt. If the loan is nonrecourse in the same scenario, then both
the funder and the lawyer have powerful incentives to settle quickly,
perhaps at their clients’ expense. But it is also possible to overlay the
financier’s incentives with the plaintiffs’ incentives such that the financier, who has litigation expertise, sophistication, and substantial capital involved, will monitor the attorney and counterbalance the
attorney’s incentives in ways that thwart at least some of the agency
problems.
Still, the overlap is not perfect: There will inevitably be some slippage at the margins, which means that while funders’ oversight can
stymie certain types of unethical behavior, it may exacerbate others.
The financier is, after all, an intermediary with its own interests at
stake and is less directly accountable to the plaintiffs than the attorneys it oversees.214 Nevertheless, financiers can play an important role
in funding expensive litigation that plaintiffs’ firms might not be able
to afford and in offsetting attorneys’ financial self-interest.
A. Revisiting the Missing Monitor Problem: Unbundling Agency
from Financing
Aligning financiers’ incentives with plaintiffs’ incentives requires
the financiers to become client-like by sharing a stake in the litigation’s outcome. Just as the contingent-fee arrangement partially
211

Steinitz, supra note 155, at 1319.
E.g., Goldstein & Edelman, supra note 14.
213 Steinitz, supra note 155, at 1319.
214 See Issacharoff & Ortiz, supra note 8, at 1644–45 (discussing proposals for how
intermediaries, which are less accountable to the principals than the agents they oversee,
may improve oversight of the agents).
212
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assigns the attorney a portion of the plaintiff’s proceeds, partially
assigning the funder a percentage of the proceeds in exchange for
financing the lawsuit on a nonrecourse basis makes that financier a
super stakeholder.215
Allowing third parties, like commercial-claims lenders, to invest
in the litigation’s outcome by contracting directly with plaintiffs generates two positive effects. First, it disentangles—at least in part—the
lawyer’s role as investor from her role as a fiduciary and advisor.
When litigating no longer threatens the law firm’s solvency or ability
to take on other matters, the attorney’s loyalty no longer divides
between self-preservation and her clients: She can afford to be a
faithful representative. Second, assigning a financier a percentage of
the plaintiffs’ winnings converts that financier into a sizeable stakeholder and incentivizes it to monitor the attorneys and the litigation’s
costs. Because aggregate litigation is capital-intensive, the investor can
act as an advocate for the plaintiff by keeping costs reasonable. If the
attorney wants to borrow money for travel and experts at a high
interest rate, the investor has the incentive to prevent that transaction
and finance those expenses at a lower cost. And, unlike geographically
dispersed plaintiffs who face collective-action problems, a single,
experienced financier can, for instance, require attorneys to keep their
travel budgets reasonable.
But the need for monitoring and the degree to which agency is
disentangled from risk depends chiefly on how the third-party financier compensates the lawyer for her services. This section considers
three options: (1) financiers pay the attorneys an hourly rate on the
billable-hour system, (2) attorneys receive a discounted contingent fee
that accounts for the lack of financial risk, or (3) financiers pay attorneys on a billable-hour rate plus some small percentage of the proceeds as a bonus.
1. Paying Plaintiffs’ Attorneys on a Billable-Hour System
Paying attorneys a billable-hour rate cleanly severs a lawyer’s
role as a risk-taking investor from her role as a client advisor and fiduciary. This allows the lawyer to be more loyal to her clients and diminishes her incentive to arrange a quick settlement or to collude with the
defendant to settle on suboptimal terms. Moreover, a litigation-savvy
215 For an alternative argument that plaintiffs should assign their full claim to a financier, see Schanzenbach & Dana, supra note 166, at 8–11. For an early assessment of this
idea, see Kevin M. Clermont & John D. Currivan, Improving on the Contingent Fee, 63
CORNELL L. REV. 529, 596 (1978). This “full assignment” approach works less well when
plaintiffs care about participating in the litigation, as most mass tort and employment discrimination plaintiffs do.
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financier could negotiate a better hourly rate and thereby prevent
astronomical fees while ensuring that the case is adequately funded.
Were a quick settlement offer generous enough to cover the financier’s expenses and provide it with some return on the risk, the financier might push plaintiffs to accept the settlement, but here the
billable-hour attorney’s self-interest checks the financier’s.216 If anything, a billable-hour attorney would prefer to prolong the litigation,
advise plaintiffs to wait for a better deal, and thus counterbalance the
investor.
The billable-hour system also encourages lawyers to spend time
counseling their clients about the alternative options available and
explaining the risks of litigating versus settling, which helps curtail the
effect of contrast biases and uninformed risk preferences.217 This
arrangement may likewise negate some of the pressure attorneys feel
to force their clients to settle and misallocate settlement funds to pay
off holdouts.218 When an attorney’s payday is not inherently tied to
settling the lawsuit (as it is when she works on a contingent fee), it
alleviates her pressing financial concerns. So, though the attorney’s
ability to tender finality to the defendant is still vital for achieving a
satisfactory settlement, she no longer feels the accompanying financial
urgency and self-interest concerns that the current system engenders.
There are hazards involved with this billable-hour option, too.
For example, there is some risk that the billable-hour attorney would
encourage her clients to accept a settlement that was not in their best
interests if it furthered her prospects of doing repeat business with the
financier. Thus, the collusion occurs not between plaintiffs’ attorneys
and defense attorneys, but between plaintiffs’ attorneys and
funders.219
But perhaps the most worrisome aspect of this compensation
scheme is whether it would still attract the best and brightest plaintiffs’ attorneys. Although defense attorneys on the billable-hour
216 See Coffee, supra note 33, at 342 (describing how the attorneys’ interests could counterbalance those of a third-party funder in such a circumstance).
217 See supra Part II.B.2 (discussing how contrast bias and uninformed risk preferences
may interfere with plaintiffs’ ability to act rationally).
218 See supra Part I.B (explaining the incentives in the current system for plaintiffs’
attorneys to engage in certain questionable practices).
219 See infra Part III.D.2. Collusion might occur in different forms, such as the financier
paying the attorney a referral fee for clients. This would, of course, violate Rules 1.7(a)(2)
and 7.2(b) of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L
CONDUCT R. 1.7(a)(2), 7.2(b) (2011). A conflict also exists if the lawyer’s interest “would
materially impair [her] ability to consider alternative courses of action that otherwise might
be available to a client, to discuss all relevant aspects of the subject matter of the representation with the client, or otherwise to provide effective representation.” RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 125 cmt. c (2011).
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system make a very nice income, one rarely sees them with their own
private planes and yachts, possessions not uncommon for successful
mass-tort plaintiffs’ attorneys. While third-party financing would
increase competition among the plaintiffs’ bar and may thus foster
innovation and loyalty, the question remains whether plaintiffs would
still receive advocacy of the same quality and creativity and whether
trading some ingenuity for greater loyalty is worth the cost.
2. Splitting the Contingent Fee Between Financiers and Plaintiffs’
Attorneys
A second option allows attorneys and financiers to split the attorneys’ standard contingent fee. Here, the lawyers would receive a
reduced award since they are shouldering less financial risk, but the
payoff could still be quite lucrative. This option recognizes that contingent fees and their attendant rewards encourage entrepreneurial
attorneys to accept monolithic cases and thus promotes ex post law
enforcement. It likewise accounts for the lingering reputational risks
that attorneys must shoulder despite taking on less financial risk.220
As noted, most claimants agree to a contingent fee between
thirty-three and forty percent, though some judges have reduced that
fee to between twenty-five and twenty-eight percent.221 Assuming the
initial agreement’s range provides ample incentive to accept the case’s
risks, the total percentage allocated to parties other than the plaintiffs
should not exceed those parameters.222 Attorneys and financiers
might divide the total by splitting the percentage in some agreed upon
fashion.
The trouble with this financing scheme is that if both funders and
attorneys operated purely on a percentage-of-the-proceeds payment
plan, their incentives would overlap with one another to a certain
degree,223 but not necessarily with the plaintiffs. Like the contingentfee attorney today, both would have some motivation to achieve a
higher settlement since it means a greater profit, but the attendant
risks of that fee arrangement would plague plaintiffs to an even
220

See supra Part II.B.1 (discussing the reputational risks borne by plaintiffs’ attorneys).
See supra notes 68-79 and accompanying text for a discussion of fee reductions in
nonclass aggregations.
222 This total range roughly aligns with the percentages permitted in Australia and the
United Kingdom. For example, one Australian company receives around thirty percent of
the proceeds plus their costs and one funder in the United Kingdom receives between
twenty-five and fifty percent of the litigation’s proceeds. Martin, supra note 138, at 107,
113.
223 Because attorneys are the ones working directly on the case, they may want to settle
sooner, whereas the financiers might want the attorneys to continue working to maximize
the settlement amount (and the financiers’ return on the investment).
221
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greater degree.224 Both financiers and attorneys may prefer to settle
quickly (provided the offer exceeds the costs and fees), collude with
the defendant if the deal financially benefits them, pressure plaintiffs
to accept an offer through questionable means, and misallocate settlement funds if it is necessary for achieving the deal’s required consensus.225 The added voice of the financier may only further
encourage the attorney to engage in these questionable practices. So,
while a third-party funder could ensure that litigation is not
underfunded and might negotiate a reduced attorneys’ fee, the savings
would benefit the investor, not the plaintiffs.
3. Paying Plaintiffs’ Attorneys for Their Billable Hours Plus a
Small Percentage of the Gross Proceeds
While awarding attorneys a pure percentage of the proceeds
would attract creative, entrepreneurial lawyers, the better approach is
for the funder to negotiate a billable-hour rate plus a small percentage
of the gross proceeds as a successful litigation bonus.226 Providing a
bonus and having a sophisticated financier oversee the billable hours
allays at least some of the traditional objections to having a billablehour system. For example, these objections include that billable hours
encourage lawyers to duplicate their efforts and not communicate
effectively with their clients, fail to provide predictable client costs,
and penalize efficient and productive lawyers.227 Having a financier
foot the bill actually encourages attorneys to spend time communicating with their clients. And bonuses reward efficiency and productivity while helping to counteract any tendency to unduly prolong the
litigation or duplicate effort. Granted, there is still some risk that
attorneys might cherry pick certain cases for continued litigation (and
224

See supra Part I.B (describing the risks of contingent fees in aggregate litigation).
Id.
226 Splitting the net proceeds (gross proceeds minus billable hours) as opposed to the
gross proceeds would incentivize the attorney to work only the number of hours that maximizes the net proceeds, which could make her indifferent to the number of hours worked.
Splitting the gross proceeds, by contrast, would incentivize the attorney to work hard to
maximize the overall settlement value. Clermont & Currivan, supra note 215, at 536-37.
My thanks to Kevin Clermont for this observation. Again, the total amount of the proceeds
going to entities other than the plaintiff should not exceed a standard contingent-fee rate.
This should not run into prohibitions on fee splitting because the financier is paying the
attorney, not splitting the attorney’s fee. When a third party pays someone else’s fees, best
practices require informed consent and an assurance that confidential information will
remain protected. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.8(f), 1.6, 2.1, 5.4(c) (2011).
For a discussion of these issues, see infra Part III.D.1.
227 See AM. BAR ASS’N, ABA COMMISSION ON BILLABLE HOURS REPORT 6 (2002)
(listing objections to the system of billable hours); Clermont & Currivan, supra note 215, at
567-69 (discussing problems with the billable hour).
225
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the billable hours that accompany them). Yet, the attorney’s reputation among the financiers might serve as a failsafe. If the attorney
hopes to gain repeat business from financiers while maintaining her
reputation as a faithful agent to her clients, then she may continue to
litigate only where it best serves her client’s interests.
By injecting a sophisticated financier into the lawsuit and making
it the largest stakeholder, this arrangement improves the status quo by
addressing the two principal problems identified in Part I: the potential funding gap for less established or less solvent plaintiffs’ firms, and
the agency problem that arises when an attorney acts as both the
lawyer and investor for numerous, disaggregated plaintiffs.
First, financiers enable plaintiffs’ law firms with less capital to litigate high stakes, resource-intensive cases, which increases competition
within the private bar.228 Once a market for funding aggregate litigation emerges, it is also likely to spur competition among financiers.
This could, in turn, mean that they would accept a lower percentage of
the proceeds for stronger cases.229 Solving this problem is thus relatively straightforward, whereas the monitoring problem and the complex incentive structure that underlies it are more complicated.
Second, to address this complexity, this proposal incentivizes financiers to monitor the attorneys, while reducing the need for monitoring in the first place. The need for oversight results from bundling
financial risk with the attorney’s duty of loyalty to clients; self-interest
in avoiding financial strain tempts attorneys to engage in self-dealing
and overbearing (if not unethical) settlement practices. Uncoupling
these divergent obligations permits the financier to negotiate a competitively priced fee and to monitor the monthly costs. With the
lawyer’s financial wellbeing secured by the financier’s nonrecourse
investment in the litigation’s proceeds, she can faithfully and loyally
represent her clients’ best interests as well as counterbalance any
undue settlement pressure the financier exerts.
B. Decision-Making Control
Ethical rules in the United States currently prohibit funders from
interfering with or controlling litigation.230 And most financiers pub228 See generally RAND CTR. FOR LAW & PUB. POLICY, supra note 27, at 19 (“Thirdparty funding has the potential to make some smaller firms contenders for large cases,
which may, in turn, cause increased competition with larger firms.”).
229 See Molot, supra note 18, at 107 (hypothesizing that plaintiffs would be able to take
advantage of competition among funders to get the best price).
230 See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.2(a) (2011) (requiring a lawyer to
“abide by a client’s decisions concerning the objectives of representation” and to “consult
with the client as to the means [for pursuing those objectives]”).
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licly disavow any authority over the case,231 though some, like Richard
Fields, Juridica’s CEO, admit it is “sometimes a challenge to remain
hands-off.”232 Fields explains:
What we do is ask clients to keep us informed if some material
event happens in the case, and we ask for quarterly reports. A lot of
times we work with clients to set up budgets for the case, and sometimes we bring in people to monitor billing guidelines on the client’s
behalf.233

Similarly, Burford Financial states that “it leaves litigation and
settlement decisions to the client and lawyer. [The company] has no
authority to influence either. Clients and their lawyers may sometimes
choose to solicit Burford’s views, but Burford cannot and does not
impose its views.”234 The terms of Burford’s financing agreement with
the Ecuadorian plaintiffs and subsequent reports of Burford’s involvement, however, tell a different story:235 The financing affected settlement decisions by penalizing plaintiffs if they accepted an offer of less
than $1 billion;236 Burford introduced the litigation team to lawyers in
the United States;237 and Burford also reportedly remained “active in
case strategy.”238 On the receiving end, lawyers observe that they have
“seen everything from funders who want to be involved in everyday
management [to] funders who take a hands-off approach.”239
Introducing a third party into group litigation that already entails
fragmented decision making raises questions about who controls
major decisions such as which attorneys to hire, whether to consent to
a settlement, and which litigation strategies to pursue.240 Were a financier to take on a pure monitoring role, akin to that of an institutional
231 See, e.g., Burford Grp. LLC, supra note 151, at 5 (“Burford does not replace the
party in interest or direct the litigation. Burford does not hire or fire the lawyers, direct
strategy or make settlement decisions. Instead, Burford is a purely passive provider of nonrecourse financing to a corporate party.”).
232 Maleske, supra note 197.
233 Id.
234 Burford Grp. LLC, supra note 151, at 14–15.
235 Parloff, supra note 15.
236 Id.
237 Id.
238 Id.; cf. Abu-Ghazaleh v. Chaul, 36 So. 3d 691, 692–94 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2009)
(finding that the funder, which “had to approve the filing of the lawsuit; controlled the
selection of the plaintiffs’ attorneys; recruited fact and expert witnesses; received, reviewed
and approved counsel’s bills; and had the ability to veto any settlement agreements,” was
so involved with the litigation that it was considered a party to the suit).
239 Raymond, supra note 138 (quoting an interview with attorney James Hosking, who
has used third-party funding in international arbitrations).
240 See Sebok, supra note 18, at 111 (listing decisions, in the context of a brief discussion
of the difference between intermeddling profit maintenance and champerty, that funders
probably could control and others that they probably could not).
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lead plaintiff in a securities class action, it would necessitate more
decisional control.241 In fact, in the United Kingdom, the funders’ selfregulatory code allows them either to require that litigants request
and follow counsel’s settlement advice or to seek a second, but
binding, opinion from another attorney.242 But this level of authority
reduces what little autonomy plaintiffs have over their claim once it
has been lumped together with other claims; aggregating claims
already empowers lawyers at the plaintiffs’ expense and makes any
meaningful participation in the litigation process impractical.243 And
the need for autonomy matters a great deal in claims like personal
injury, product liability, and employment discrimination, where claims
may be independently economically marketable, but the courts or
their attorneys pool them together for efficiency and consistency.244
Allocating control to financiers likewise prompts questions about
conflicts of interest: A financier has fiduciary duties to its investors,
whereas attorneys have loyalty obligations to their clients.245 When
financiers are not attorneys, they are not subject to the rules of professional conduct that constrain the attorney-client relationship. This creates an entirely new problem—namely, that funders could
theoretically finance conflicting matters and solicit clients without any
corresponding duties of good faith and loyalty.246
Fortunately, unbundling financial risk from the attorney’s agency
requires a less overt monitor. In fact, giving the financier too much
authority would simply substitute the contingent-fee lawyer’s potentially overbearing settlement demands with the financier’s and leave
plaintiffs no better off. But the financier must have some say in certain
matters.
241 See Burch, supra note 186, at 1177-79 (arguing that lead plaintiffs should be given
more control over decision making than they currently receive).
242 See CIVIL JUSTICE COUNCIL, A SELF REGULATORY CODE FOR THIRD PARTY
FUNDING ¶ 1.1, at 20, ¶ 7.2, at 24 (Dec. 2010), http://blog.internationalpractice.org/wpcontent/uploads/2011/07/A-Self-Regulatory-Code-for-Third-Party-Funding.pdf.
243 See Erichson & Zipursky, supra note 4, at 268–69 (describing and critiquing the phenomenon of “lawyer empowerment” in the mass-tort context).
244 Autonomy matters far less when claims are less about compensating the victim and
more about deterring the defendant, such as antitrust, consumer fraud, and, for smaller,
well-diversified investors, securities fraud cases. If the latter category of cases avoids arbitration, they are still more likely to proceed as class actions or not at all. Class actions raise
special questions about notice and consent to third-party funding that this Article does not
address.
245 As Roger Parloff pointed out in his Article on Burford’s financing of the
Ecuadorians’ litigation against Chevron, this complicated relationship has the potential to
dilute “the sacrosanct attorney-client relationship.” Parloff, supra note 15.
246 See Steinitz, supra note 155, at 1294 (pointing out that “finance firms are not subject
to the constraints imposed by the canons of professional responsibility”).
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First, like an attorney, a financier decides whether to front the
litigation costs for a partial assignment of the plaintiff’s proceeds on a
case-by-case or litigation-by-litigation basis. Though both the attorney
and financier have incentives to vet the case, those incentives differ. A
lawyer with only her reputation at stake might represent high-profile,
social-change litigation, whereas a financier shouldering the financial
risk would prefer cases that promised significant monetary return.
Second, the financier should negotiate the hourly rate and successful
litigation bonus with the plaintiffs’ chosen attorney. Though the total
amount should not exceed what a plaintiff typically agrees to in a contingent fee, that leaves a sophisticated financier plenty of negotiating
room, particularly if it funds numerous plaintiffs.
Finally, even though financiers should not control litigation
strategy or dictate the settlement terms, there are two important reasons to let them provide claimants with the equivalent of an advisory
opinion as to the settlement’s merit. First, if claimants are actually
similarly situated and likeminded, then introducing a fresh voice—
perhaps one of a very different mind about the settlement offer—
injects new information into the discussion, challenges the status quo,
and thereby thwarts group polarization and confirmation bias.247
Introducing cognitively diverse perspectives into group decision
making can often lead to novel insights, creative solutions, and
enhanced problem solving through robust debate.248 It likewise helps
247

See Michael A. Hogg & Sarah C. Hains, Friendship and Group Identification: A New
Look at the Role of Cohesiveness in Groupthink, 28 EUR. J. SOC. PSYCHOL. 323, 324 (1998)
(describing the “symptoms of groupthink” and associated “defects in the decision-making
process” generated by the cohesiveness of the group); Ulrich Klocke, How To Improve
Decision Making in Small Groups: Effects of Dissent and Training Interventions, 38 SMALL
GROUP RES. 437, 438-39, 460–62 (2007) (discussing studies indicating that groups that are
more receptive to external information make higher quality decisions, while reporting the
author’s finding that introducing dissent into group discussions actually increases preference bias).
248 See SCOTT E. PAGE, THE DIFFERENCE: HOW THE POWER OF DIVERSITY CREATES
BETTER GROUPS, FIRMS, SCHOOLS, AND SOCIETIES 7–8 (2007) (describing how members of
a diverse group perceive and interpret the world differently, use different tools to solve
problems, and analyze relationships between ideas differently); L. Richard Hoffman &
Norman R.F. Maier, Quality and Acceptance of Problem Solutions by Members of
Homogenous and Heterogeneous Groups, 62 J. ABNORMAL & SOC. PSYCHOL. 401, 402, 407
(1961) (reporting the experimental finding that heterogeneous groups’ solutions to
problems are superior to those of homogeneous groups); Eden B. King et al., Conflict and
Cooperation in Diverse Workgroups, 65 J. SOC. ISSUES 261, 272 (2009) (surveying studies
suggesting that group diversity is correlated with increased creativity, communication, and
cooperation); Elizabeth Mannix & Margaret A. Neale, What Differences Make a
Difference?: The Promise and Reality of Diverse Teams in Organizations, 6 PSYCHOL. SCI.
PUB. INT. 31, 33–35, 41–43 (2005) (discussing and attempting to integrate positive and
negative views of the effects of group diversity); Charlan Jeanne Nemeth, Differential
Contributions of Majority and Minority Influence, 93 PSYCHOL. REV. 23, 23 (1986)
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claimants to avoid premature consensus and reach a more informed
decision. Second, it provides transparency—at least to claimants—
which promotes accountability and inhibits collusion with attorneys.249 As critics have pointed out, one of the problems with thirdparty financiers is that they influence decision making behind the
scenes—through the small print of a confidential contract, or by privately conversing with the lawyers. Giving financiers the opportunity
to present their position to the claimants prompts them to go on the
record and provide a reasoned opinion about the settlement’s merit.
The claimants can then judge for themselves whether that position is
contrary to their best interests, seek competent advice from counsel,
and decide whether to settle.250
C. The Litigation Financing Agreement
Any time a sophisticated, repeat player like a third-party financier contracts directly with what could be a legally unsophisticated clientele, the potential for overreaching exists. Preventing contractual
overreaching demands a mix of informed consent in writing ex ante
and the ability to fairly resolve disputes ex post.
First, because the attorney is typically the one who will refer her
inventory of clients to a financier at the litigation’s outset, informed
consent obligates that attorney to review the funding agreement on
the client’s behalf and fully disclose all of the agreement’s terms.251
The attorney should: (1) disclose the extent of her relationship with
the funder,252 (2) discuss the benefits of the funding arrangement
(“Minority viewpoints are important . . . because they stimulate divergent attention . . . .
[E]ven when they are wrong they contribute to the detection of novel solutions and decisions that, on balance, are qualitatively better.”); Stefan Schulz-Hardt et al., Dissent as a
Facilitator: Individual- and Group-Level Effects on Creativity and Performance, in THE
PSYCHOLOGY OF CONFLICT AND CONFLICT MANAGEMENT IN ORGANIZATIONS 149, 150-54
(Carsten K.W. De Dreu & Michele J. Gelfand eds., 2008) (describing how conflict, in the
form of exposure to dissent, facilitates creativity and performance in both individuals and
groups).
249 See Issacharoff & Ortiz, supra note 8, at 1664 (discussing the importance of
increasing transparency and the difficulty of doing so in principal-agent relationships).
250 But see ABA COMM’N ON ETHICS 20/20, supra note 156, at 29 (suggesting that the
client might be able to delegate settlement authority to a financier).
251 Most states that have considered whether it is appropriate to refer clients to thirdparty funders have concluded that it is. E.g., N.Y.C. Bar Ass’n Comm. on Prof’l and
Judicial Ethics, Formal Op. 2011-02 (2011); N.J. Supreme Court Advisory Comm. on Prof’l
Ethics, Advisory Op. 691 (2001); Nev. State Bar Standing Comm. on Ethics and Prof’l
Responsibility, Formal Op. 29 (2003); D.C. Bar Legal Ethics Comm., Ethics Op. 196
(1989); State Bar of Ariz. Comm. on the Rules of Prof’l Conduct, Ethics Op. 91-22 (1991).
252 “[T]he client is entitled to know about the risks presented by the lawyer’s financial
and other incentives created by the contract, and to have an opportunity to provide or
decline informed consent.” ABA COMM’N ON ETHICS 20/20, supra note 156, at 19.
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(such as the ability to loyally represent the client without the tugs of
financial self-interest), (3) explain how the contractual terms could
adversely affect the client’s interests and the drawbacks that could
result from signing it, (4) advise the client about seeking advice from
other counsel, and (5) explain that other attorneys might be willing to
represent the client on a traditional contingent-fee basis.253
Second, in addition to providing informed consent in writing,
funding agreements should not interfere with the client’s right to terminate the lawyer-client relationship at any time.254 This not only
avoids a conflict with public policy and ethical limitations,255 it also
gives the client some immediate recourse if she feels that the attorney
is not acting in her best interest.256 Because discharging an attorney
could affect her broader reputation among other clients, this provision
also helps prevent wrongful conduct.257 Third, deterring overreaching
and collusion entails the possibility of ex post judicial review, a subject
explored in Part III.D.2.
Claimants, however, do have an obligation to provide accurate
information to both their attorney and financier. Withholding material
facts could induce an investor to fund a claim on a fraudulent basis.
When that is the case, financiers should be permitted to cease funding
the litigation. For example, Juridica recently stopped funding S&T Oil
Equipment & Machinery Ltd. in its international arbitration against
Romania when the law firm King & Spalding withdrew from representing S&T, citing concerns that it failed to produce a critical piece of
evidence.258 In addition to rescinding its funding, Juridica also
253 See generally MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.0(e) & cmt. 6 (2009) (noting
that the lawyer must “[o]rdinarily . . . disclos[e] . . . the facts and circumstances giving rise
to the situation” and the “material advantages and disadvantages of the proposed course of
conduct and a discussion of . . . other . . . options,” and that “[i]n some circumstances it may
be appropriate for a lawyer to advise a client . . . to seek the advice of other counsel”);
MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.4(b) (2009) (requiring lawyers to explain matters
to clients so that they can make an informed decision); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE
LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 20 (2000) (same); ABA COMM’N ON ETHICS 20/20, supra
note 156, at 19 (same).
254 But see ABA COMM’N ON ETHICS 20/20, supra note 156, at 25 (concluding that giving
a financier the authority to discharge an attorney is an enforceable contractual provision
absent duress or unconscionability).
255 See, e.g., Balla v. Gambro, Inc., 584 N.E. 2d 104, 109-10 (Ill. 1991); MODEL RULES OF
PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.16(a)(3), 1.16(c) (2010); Mich. State Bar Standing Comm. on Prof’l
Ethics, Advisory Op. RI-321 (2000); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING
LAWYERS §§ 31-32 (2000).
256 See Issacharoff & Ortiz, supra note 8, at 1646.
257 Id.
258 See Nate Raymond, New Suit Against Juridica Exposes Cracks in Litigation Funding
Model, THE AMLAW DAILY (Mar. 15, 2011), http://amlawdaily.typepad.com/amlawdaily/
2011/03/litdailyjuridica.html.
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demanded that S&T reimburse all litigation expenses since Juridica
believed that S&T materially misrepresented the case’s prospects of
success, failed to disclose material information, and withheld key
facts.259
D. Implications for Reform
Shifting the status quo from contingent-fee arrangements to litigation funding agreements necessitates reexamining historical bans on
maintenance and champerty as well as contemplating how a financier
may affect the attorney-client privilege, the attorney work-product
doctrine, and attorney confidentiality. This section discusses those
issues briefly while citing more in-depth sources for the interested
reader. It also considers how financiers might affect horizontal equity,
or similar outcomes, among similarly situated plaintiffs in multidistrict
litigation and discusses ways to combat free-riding from other plaintiffs’ attorneys.
1. Augmenting Legal and Ethical Rules
Several relatively easy tweaks or extensions of existing legal doctrine would facilitate the use of third-party financiers in aggregate
lawsuits. First, if financiers are to take a more active role in funding
aggregate litigation, they must be able to independently evaluate the
claim’s merits and communicate with both the plaintiffs and the attorneys without waiving plaintiffs’ attorney-client privilege or losing
objections based on the work-product doctrine.260 Although some financiers rely principally on publicly filed pleadings and memoranda
and thus do not need access to privileged material,261 most financiers
considering whether to invest millions of dollars in funding aggregate
litigation would require that information. Sharing privileged information requires plaintiffs’ informed consent to satisfy attorneys’ ethical
duties of confidentiality,262 but it also entails considering the attorneyclient privilege and the attorney work-product doctrine. Because lawyers generally waive the work-product doctrine only when they make
disclosures that substantially increase the likelihood of putting docu259 Letter from Timothy D. Scrantom, Dir. of Juridica Capital Mgmt. Ltd., to Valerian
Simirica, S&T Oil Equip. & Mach. Ltd. (Nov. 10, 2009), available at http://
amlawdaily.typepad.com/03102011juridica_1109recession.pdf.
260 See FED. R. EVID. 502; MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6 (2009) (discussing
confidentiality in the client-lawyer relationship).
261 ABA COMM’N ON ETHICS 20/20, supra note 156, at 33.
262 See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6(a) (permitting a client to give
informed consent to disclose confidential information).
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ments in their adversary’s hands,263 it raises fewer concerns than the
attorney-client privilege.
One possibility for addressing the attorney-client privilege is to
extend the common-interest doctrine to include financiers who invest
in the lawsuit as well as those who considered investing.264 Covering
the latter category of investors encourages price competition among
financiers without jeopardizing plaintiffs’ confidential information.
The common-interest doctrine, which allows information sharing
among those with overlapping interests, evolved from situations
where two clients retained the same attorney to pursue their common
interest. The doctrine has long been used by insurance companies, in
joint defense strategies (such as by asbestos and tobacco defendants),
and by plaintiffs involved in group litigation.265 In these contexts, the
doctrine extends to “two or more clients with a common interest in a
litigated or nonlitigated matter” who are represented by the same or
separate lawyers266 and is intended to encourage full and efficient case
preparation. Although the third-party financier seems to fit neatly
under this common-interest umbrella, there is one critical matter
worth clarifying: The financier and the plaintiff cannot be considered
263 See, e.g., Mondis Tech. Ltd. v. LG Elecs., Inc., Nos. 2:07-CV-565-TJW-CE, 2:08-CV478-TJW, 2011 WL 1714304, at *3 (E.D. Tex. May 4, 2011) (finding that a party could share
information containing work-product information with investors without waiving its
protections).
264 Currently, substantial uncertainty surrounds the privilege issue. See FED. R. EVID.
502(b) (noting that inadvertent disclosure may waive the privilege); Leader Techs., Inc. v.
Facebook, Inc., 719 F. Supp. 2d 373, 376-77 (D. Del. 2010) (refusing to extend the common
interest exception to include a financier); Fla. Bar Comm. on Prof’l Ethics, Op. 00-3 (2002)
(requiring attorneys to advise clients as to whether attorney-client privilege or work
product might be waived before providing information to third-party funders); N.J.
Advisory Comm. on Prof’l Ethics, Op. 691 (2001) (requiring attorneys to ensure that clients understand the risks of external funding, including the possibility of losing the
attorney-client privilege).
265 See EDNA SELAN EPSTEIN, THE ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE AND THE WORKPRODUCT DOCTRINE 274-75 (5th ed. 2007) (discussing use of the common interest privilege); CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER & LAIRD C. KIRKPATRICK, EVIDENCE §§ 5.14, 5.15 (4th
ed. 2009) (same); James M. Fischer, The Attorney-Client Privilege Meets the Common
Interest Arrangement: Protecting Confidences While Exchanging Information for Mutual
Gain, 16 REV. LITIG. 631, 632 (1997) (same).
266 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 76 (2000)
(applying the common interest privilege to those with separate attorneys); see also
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 75 (2000) (applying the
common interest privilege to those with the same attorney); CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER &
LAIRD C. KIRKPATRICK, EVIDENCE §§ 5.14, 5.15 (4th ed. 2009) (advocating use of the
common interest privilege). There have been arguments that the common interest privilege
only applies to legal interests in anticipated or ongoing litigation, but this potential limit
should not pose a problem in the third-party financing context, since no financing relationship would exist outside of that constraint. See United States v. Duke Energy Corp., 214
F.R.D. 383, 390 (M.D.N.C. 2003) (requiring all interested parties to share a common legal
interest related to ongoing or anticipated litigation).
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joint clients of the plaintiff’s attorney. If that were the case, the lawyer
would have a duty of loyalty to the financier, not just to her client.
That would undermine the disaggregated incentive structure that promotes loyalty to plaintiffs and checks the interests of the financier.
Second, states should continue to lift the historical prohibition on
champerty such that the enforceability of a financing agreement will
not hinge on a particular state’s laws or an ad hoc balancing approach
to conflict of laws. One recent survey showed that twenty-six of fiftyone jurisdictions (including the District of Columbia) permit champerty to some degree.267 But most jurisdictions have some restrictions
to prevent the financier from promoting clearly frivolous litigation,
participating in “malice champerty,”268 or “intermeddling” (controlling trial strategy or settlement).269 Further, as Anthony Sebok has
explored in detail, the arguments for preserving the policies against
assignment and maintenance are “not currently persuasive from either
a historical or jurisprudential perspective.”270 And most studies about
champerty predict that lifting the ban will be beneficial by increasing
access to justice and improving the likelihood that settlements will
reflect a given claim’s merit, as opposed to economic pressures.271
Questionable enforceability due to the inconsistent use of the
above doctrines has driven commercial-dispute lenders to include
267 Sebok, supra note 18, at 98-99 n.162 (listing the jurisdictions that permit some degree
of champerty as Arizona, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Florida, Hawaii, Iowa,
Kansas, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Montana, New Hampshire, New
Jersey, New York, North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, South
Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, Washington, and West Virginia). Later data suggests that
Missouri should not be included among these states. The new data concerning Missouri
was revealed during a conversation I had with Sebok, where he identified Missouri’s inclusion as an error.
268 Malice champerty is “meritorious litigation employed for an improper end.” Id. at
104–05.
269 See ABA COMM’N ON ETHICS 20/20, supra note 156, at 12; Paul Bond, Making
Champerty Work: An Invitation to State Action, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 1297 app. at 1333–41
(2002) (providing an overview of champerty law in the fifty states).
270 Sebok, supra note 18, at 133.
271 See, e.g., Jonathan T. Molot, A Market in Litigation Risk, 76 U. CHI. L. REV. 367,
375-78 (2000) (advocating use of third-party financing as a way to lift economic pressures
on claimants); Jonathan T. Molot, A Market Approach to Litigation Accuracy (Sept. 2425, 2009), http://www.law.northwestern.edu/searlecenter/papers/molot_accuracy.pdf
(arguing that financing will increase the correlation between a case’s merits and its settlement value). Some commentators have argued that lifting champerty bans will encourage
frivolous lawsuits because once financiers exhaust their cache of meritorious cases, they
will turn to frivolous ones. See, e.g., Paul H. Rubin, Third Party Financing of Litigation,
PUBLIC POLICY ROUNDTABLE ON THIRD PARTY FINANCING OF LITIGATION 3 (Sept. 24-25,
2009), available at http://www.law.northwestern.edu/jep/symposia/JEP_CJ_2009_Rubin.
pdf. This argument, however, is less forceful in aggregate litigation, where strict claims and
administrative procedures post-settlement help eliminate (or reduce the cost of) weak
claims.
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arbitration provisions within their funding agreements, many of which
require international arbitration272 and none of which help develop
the law surrounding alternative litigation financing.273 This move
toward international arbitration, particularly clauses that require arbitrating in jurisdictions like the United Kingdom, is somewhat understandable given the uncertainty of domestic champerty and
maintenance laws and the United Kingdom’s general acceptance of
alternative financing. If funding agreements simply included forumselection clauses as an attempt to provide certainty regarding the
choice of law, some courts would refuse to dismiss or transfer those
cases to the specified forum if doing so would contravene that state’s
public policy.274
But international arbitration requirements do little for one-time
individual plaintiffs. Although commercial disputes involve a sophisticated clientele who may be familiar with the ins and outs of international arbitration, requiring the average individual mass-tort or
employment-discrimination victim to arbitrate her dispute internationally would be prohibitively expensive and inconvenient. She likely
would be forced to forgo her grievance, regardless of its merit. Plus, if
foreign countries take alternative legal and ethical approaches to conflicts of interest, they could raise questions about impropriety that
undermine both the funding agreement and the arbitration’s legitimacy.275 Thus, relaxing the bans on champerty and maintenance
across-the-board would ensure that these financing arrangements
were enforceable in all fora and eliminate the need to arbitrate.
272 See, e.g., Complaint at 12, S&T Oil Equip. & Mach. Ltd. v. Juridica Inv. Ltd., No. H11-542 (S.D. Tex. Feb. 14, 2011), available at http://amlawdaily.typepad.com/
03102010juridica_complaint.pdf (alleging that Juridica “fraudulently induced plaintiffs into
entering into the arbitration provision included in the Investment Agreement, which provided for arbitration in the Bailiwick of Guernsey under London Court of Arbitration
(LCIA)”); Treca Financial Solutions and Claimants Funding Agreement, ¶ 23.2, at 27 (Oct.
31, 2010), available at http://theamazonpost.com/wp-content/uploads/Mastro-declarationExs-1-10-05jul11.pdf (requiring, in a funding agreement between Buford Financial and the
Ecuadorian plaintiffs in their litigation against Chevron, that “[a]ny dispute, controversy or
claim arising out of or in connection with this Agreement . . . shall (to the exclusion of any
other forum) be referred to and finally resolved by arbitration administered by the
International Centre for Dispute Resolution in accordance with its International
Arbitration Rules”).
273 Most arbitration is confidential and thus does not create precedent or develop the
law.
274 See The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 15–17 (1972) (suggesting that
forum-selection clauses that contravene an important public policy of the forum might be
unenforceable).
275 Complaint, supra note 272, at 12 (alleging that Juridica “failed to disclose that at
least one of [its] non-executive directors and another lawyer, Daniel Brennan, is and was at
the time of the arbitration agreement’s execution, a member of the LCIA board of
directors”).
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2. Tailoring Judicial and Ethical Checks
Both the potential for overreaching in the litigation funding
agreement and the potential collusion between attorneys and financiers pose critical ethical concerns. These concerns are interrelated
pragmatically—an attorney who colludes with the financier is likely to
encourage clients to sign unconscionable funding agreements—and
widespread use of arbitration provisions makes it nearly impossible to
review these issues outside of legal ethics proceedings. The problems
are both practical and legal. First, with regard to the practical
problems, arbitrations make it extraordinarily difficult for all but the
wealthiest plaintiffs to pursue their rights against investors, as such
arbitrations often occur in international venues and require plaintiffs
to retain alternative counsel.276 Widespread arbitration also precludes
development of the law surrounding alternative litigation financing.
Second, with regard to legal problems, the Supreme Court has
recently held that financiers can prevent class or group arbitration,
even if they finance plaintiffs en masse.277 Freedom of contract and
court deference to arbitration provisions under the Federal
Arbitration Act further limit judicial solutions.278 Even though a
plaintiff might claim that the funding agreement is unenforceable
based on contractual defenses like fraud, duress, or unconscionability,
unless she specifically challenges the arbitration provision, courts may
send those questions to the arbitrator to decide.279
276 Most studies of disciplinary actions for excessive fees or attorney misconduct support
this notion. See ABA COMM’N ON EVALUATION OF DISCIPLINARY ENFORCEMENT,
LAWYER REGULATION FOR A NEW CENTURY 11 (1992), available at http://www.
americanbar.org/groups/professional_responsibility/resources/report_archive/mckay_
report.html (“The disciplinary system was not designed to address complaints about the
quality of lawyers’ services or fee disputes.”); Lester Brickman, Contingency Fee Abuses,
Ethical Mandates, and the Disciplinary System: The Case Against Case-by-Case
Enforcement, 53 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1339, 1345 (1996) (“Contingency fee lawyers are
virtually never disciplined for charging unreasonable fees . . . .”). But see Christopher R.
Drahozal, Arbitration Costs and Contingent Fee Contracts, 59 VAND. L. REV. 729, 734
(2006) (arguing that contingent fees can “provid[e] a mechanism by which arbitration can
enhance, rather than restrict claimants’ access to justice”).
277 See AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1750–53 (2011) (holding that
where a contract does not specifically allow class arbitration, there can be no switch from
bilateral to class arbitration); see also Jessie Kokrda Kamens, Will Class Actions Survive
Ruling by Supreme Court in Concepcion?, BNA CLASS ACTION LITIG. REP., May 13, 2011
(analyzing the Concepcion opinion).
278 See Thomas V. Burch, Regulating Mandatory Arbitration, UTAH L. REV. (forthcoming 2012) (manuscript at 2, 5), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1793303.
279 See Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna, 546 U.S. 440, 444-46, 448–49 (2006)
(holding that challenges to the validity of the agreement to arbitrate may be litigated in
court, whereas challenges to the contract as a whole must be litigated before the arbitrator); Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 404 (1967) (“[I]n
passing upon a § 3 application for a stay while the parties arbitrate, a federal court may
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Market solutions have limited potential to do what judicial remedies cannot. If financiers compete for the best cases (meritorious
claims represented by attorneys with solid reputations), then the
informed consumer can shop around for financing without arbitration
strings attached. The trouble is, attorneys are likely the ones referring
clients to financiers. And attorneys’ preferred financiers may depend
more on the hourly rate and on the percentage of the proceeds the
financier will pay attorneys than the clients’ best interests. This brings
us back to the potential for collusion between the financier and
attorney. Unlike clients, who are typically one-shot players, financiers
and lawyers are repeat players; their relationships are more
enduring.280
This potentially powerful bond between financiers and attorneys
suggests that judges must play a mitigating role by policing these
financing contracts. But two developments must occur before they can
do so. First, judges must know that an alternative financing arrangement exists.281 Accordingly, in multidistrict litigation, there should be
mandatory, in camera disclosure of financing agreements. Currently,
financing agreements contain confidentiality provisions, and financiers
regularly require plaintiffs to sign additional non-disclosure agreements.282 Although these measures keep the defendant from
exploiting this information to the plaintiffs’ detriment, submitting the
funding agreement to the judge in camera would allow the judge not
only to learn of its existence and ensure that its terms are not unconscionable,283 but also to recuse herself if she has a disqualifying relaconsider only issues relating to the making and performance of the agreement to arbitrate.”); Nagrampa v. MailCoups, Inc., 469 F.3d 1257, 1277 (9th Cir. 2006) (“If . . . the
district court concludes that the challenge is not to the arbitration provision itself but,
rather, to the validity of the entire contract, then the issue of the contract’s validity should
be considered by an arbitrator in the first instance.”); Toledano v. O’Connor, 501 F. Supp.
2d 127, 141 (D.D.C. 2007) (“The district court is therefore the appropriate forum for adjudicating all of plaintiffs’ challenges—to the arbitration provision, to enforcement of that
provision, and to the existence of the contract containing that provision.”).
280 Steinitz, supra note 155, at 1325.
281 This is somewhat akin to Rule 7.1, which requires corporations to identify any parent
corporation owning more than ten percent of a party’s stock. FED. R. CIV. P. 7.1.
282 See, e.g., Complaint, supra note 272, at 9; Treca Financial Solutions and Claimants
Funding Agreement, supra note 272, ¶ 12, at 18 (requiring claimants not to disclose the
terms of the agreement for seven years after its termination and to “destroy or return all
Funder Information to the Funder”).
283 Judges may ensure that fees adhere to ethics and professional responsibility standards even absent a fee challenge. See, e.g., Jacobs v. Mancuso, 825 F.2d 559, 564 (1st Cir.
1987); Rosquist v. Soo Line R.R., 692 F.2d 1107, 1111 (7th Cir. 1982); In re Zyprexa Prods.
Liab. Litig., 424 F. Supp. 2d 488, 492-93 (E.D.N.Y. 2006); Farmington Dowel Prod. Co. v.
Forster Mfg. Co., 297 F. Supp. 924, 925-30 (D. Me. 1969); Charles Kocoras, Comment,
Contingent Fees—A Judge’s Perch, 47 DEPAUL L. REV. 421, 422-23 (1998).
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tionship with the financier.284 Moreover, should it become necessary,
this enables the judge to report unethical behavior between attorneys
and financiers to the relevant bar authorities.
Second, as Congress has done in similar areas of consumer concern,285 it should prohibit arbitration in consumer-financing agreements.286 This would ensure some transparency in the funding process
through enforcement challenges, allow consumers to vindicate their
contractual rights in a convenient forum (that is, not an international
venue), and, by establishing precedent through the judicial system,
outline the permissible bounds of litigation funding agreements.
Potential judicial enforcement also deters collusive behavior between
the financier and the plaintiffs’ attorneys: When they know that the
agreement is not shrouded in arbitration’s confidentiality and may be
presented before a judge (and in publicly filed documents), they will
be far less likely to engage in clandestine behavior.
3. Maintaining Horizontal Equity Among Plaintiffs
Just as they do now, well-financed, well-established law firms are
likely to eschew alternative financing.287 Being paid on an hourly basis
284 See, e.g., Parloff, supra note 15 (discussing an instance in which a special master
learned that he was co-counsel with a member of the hedge fund’s board).
285 See, e.g., Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No.
111-203, § 1028, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (creating the Bureau of Consumer Financial
Protection and giving that Bureau power over arbitration provisions in “consumer financial products and services” agreements); Department of Defense Appropriations Act of
2010, Pub. L. No. 111-118, § 8116, 123 Stat. 3409 (2009) (prohibiting the government from
hiring employers that require their employees to arbitrate Title VII claims or sexual assault
or harassment claims); Food, Conservation, and Energy Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-234,
§ 210, 122 Stat. 923 (permitting parties to opt out of arbitration in livestock and poultry
contracts); John Warner National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007, Pub. L.
No. 109-364, § 987(f)(4), 120 Stat. 2083 (2006) (exempting military personnel from having
to arbitrate consumer credit disputes) (codified at 10 U.S.C. § 987(f)(4)); see also Burch,
supra note 278, at 26–27; Steven Greenhouse, Labor Board Backs Workers on Joint
Arbitration Cases, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 6, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/01/07/business/
nlrb-backs-workers-on-joint-arbitration-cases.html.
286 This may also be a task appropriate for the newly minted Bureau for Consumer
Financial Protection. Though Congress has ample authority for prohibiting arbitration
awards, the Bureau’s authority is less certain. The Dodd-Frank Act gives the Bureau the
authority to “regulate the offering of . . . consumer financial products . . . under the Federal
consumer financial laws” and to regulate and restrict mandatory pre-dispute arbitration
agreements. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act § 1011. DoddFrank defines “consumer financial product” as extending credit to consumers “primarily
for personal, family, or household purposes.” Id. § 1002. Although funding agreements
enable consumers to litigate in the hopes of receiving damages that compensate them, their
families, or their households, it is unclear whether the Bureau will decide that this falls
within its auspices.
287 See Frankel, supra note 143 (“Well-financed plaintiffs firms tend to stay away from
litigation finance companies; as Christopher Seeger of New York’s Seeger Weiss notes, ‘It’s
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plus a small percentage of the proceeds may not generate the same
extravagant fees that a traditional contingent fee would.288 That, plus
the restrictions of having to answer to an intermediary, may only fuel
the potential for horizontal inequity among similarly situated plaintiffs. For example, in the Ground Zero litigation, attorneys Paul
Napoli and Marc Bern tried to pass the interest costs of borrowing
money onto their clients, whereas another firm also representing
Ground Zero workers borrowed nothing.289 In other words, the latter
plaintiffs would have received more money for similar claims. To minimize the danger of disparate fees, the system I have proposed employs
current contingent-fee rates as a presumptively adequate ceiling for
financiers to include in their agreements. This keeps the absolute percentage of the proceeds going to entities other than the plaintiffs similar across the board.
4. Taxing Free Riders
Having attorneys with different funding arrangements involved in
the same multidistrict litigation exacerbates a concern about free
riders when some attorneys perform common-benefit work for all
plaintiffs. The concern exists regardless of whether financiers are
involved,290 but the way in which judges have handled compensation
in the past—by adding to and subtracting from fee awards291—would
not only interfere with funders’ contractual rights, it could deter them
from investing in aggregate litigation altogether.
If the established plaintiffs firms self-fund and continue to use
their strong reputations to leverage favorable settlements from defendants, they are likely to be the chosen ones serving on plaintiffs’
steering committees and performing common-benefit work.292
Traditionally, judges have used the common fund theory to reduce litigation fees of lawyers who may have large client inventories, but have
ridiculous how much they charge.’ Firms that can afford to usually prefer to invest their
own capital in experts, case screening, discovery and trial expenses.”).
288 See supra Part III.A.3.
289 Goldstein & Edelman, supra note 14.
290 See Curtis & Resnik, supra note 65, at 444 (“The worry is about ‘free riders’ who
obtain clients and receive, by private contract, significant percentages of the clients’ recoveries for minimal work.”).
291 See supra notes 68–82 and accompanying text (discussing judicial tinkering with fee
awards).
292 If plaintiffs’ attorneys reach a consensus about who should serve on the steering
committees, the judge often defers to that consensus. See, e.g., PRAKASH, supra note 66, at
13-14 (discussing Judge Fallon’s ratification of the plaintiffs’ attorneys’ choice for steering
committee chairs in the Vioxx litigation). Plaintiffs’ attorneys are likely to select lawyers
with established reputations as opposed to newcomers.

\\jciprod01\productn\N\NYU\87-5\NYU502.txt

1334

unknown

Seq: 62

NEW YORK UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

23-OCT-12

14:02

[Vol. 87:1273

done little to advance the litigation—whether by choice or not.293 But
this traditional system creates free riders once financiers enter the picture. Though “outsider” attorneys paid on a “billable-hour-plus” basis
(that is, those using the form of third-party financing proposed in this
article) would still receive less, the financiers could receive more than
they bargained for due, in part, to the efforts of trailblazing attorneys.
Conversely, if the billable-hour attorney performed common-benefit
work, she might receive less remuneration than would counsel
working on a contingent-fee arrangement. Yet, her work benefits all
of the plaintiffs. So, unless the same investor had a funding relationship with each plaintiff, the other plaintiffs’ attorneys—those not
using alternative financing—would be enriched without cost.
Both situations suggest that something other than the status quo
is appropriate, but judicial interference with the funding relationship
could undermine the positive effects of unbundling agency and risk.294
Solving this problem entails reconsidering how judges compensate
plaintiffs’ steering committees and common-benefit counsel. As
Professors Silver and Miller have argued, committee members’ compensation is best addressed by taxing the total recovery from the multidistrict litigation and then subtracting that tax from each client’s
attorney’s fee (or financier’s proceeds) such that the tax is spread
across all participating plaintiffs in proportion to their recovery.295
Although this means that financiers must consider the tax in drafting
the litigation funding agreement and subtract it from their overall proceeds, this is a relatively straightforward fix.
IV
COSTS, BENEFITS, AND OBJECTIONS
This article has set forth, in broad strokes, the normative argument in favor of allowing third-party funders to serve as the missing
monitor in aggregate litigation. By unbundling an attorney’s duty as
293 As Professors Silver and Miller explained in the Vioxx litigation context, when
judges appoint attorneys to inside positions, they “create[ ] relationships of dependency”
such that attorneys on the outskirts must “rely on a coterie of litigation managers to
develop their clients’ cases. The disabled lawyers’ clients also lose control. They are at the
mercy of lawyers they never hired and can not discharge.” Silver & Miller, supra note 41,
at 119.
294 Judges lack clear authority for making these changes. The ad hoc nature with which
they interfere makes the funding venture even riskier for financiers.
295 Silver & Miller, supra note 41, at 161. One of the principal objections to this
approach is that attorneys may aggregate low value cases in hopes of achieving judicial
appointment. The authors suggest that judges could readily identify and exclude weak
cases through, for example, requiring a licensed medical doctor to certify that each plaintiff
has the particular disorder in question. Id. at 163–64.
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an agent from that of a financier, we can alleviate a principal incentive
to engage in unethical behavior. And, by allowing financiers to invest
in aggregate litigation’s outcome, we can create an intermediary monitor. But though this manages some of the principal-agent problems in
nonclass aggregation, it introduces a new twist—another entity—and
a unique set of incentives that could work to the plaintiffs’ detriment.
So, does this improve the status quo?
This final Part addresses that question by summarizing this proposal’s benefits and confronting lingering concerns. Many of the primary benefits have been discussed already, such as (1) unbundling the
lawyer’s financial risk from her duty of loyalty; (2) enabling the financier to negotiate a competitive rate, monitor the monthly bills, state its
position on settlement, and thereby stymie group polarization; (3)
engendering a system of checks whereby a loyal attorney
counterbalances a financier’s push for settlement; (4) using billable
hours to motivate attorneys to counsel clients through litigation decisions; and (5) avoiding ethically questionable practices like quick
settlements.296
The following four advantages can be added to these benefits.
First, like well-capitalized contingent-fee attorneys, third-party financiers may pursue nonclass aggregation that would be uneconomical as
a stand-alone case but that would provide a significant return in the
aggregate. This does not include small-stakes or negative-value claims,
such as consumer-fraud cases, because individual plaintiffs are
unlikely to come forward in numbers that make litigation viable. It
would, however, include claims like those pursued by the women in
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes—plaintiffs whose individual claims
might not make it economical to take on a corporation like Wal-Mart,
but whose claims are worth litigating collectively. Without this kind of
socially desirable, deterrence-based litigation, corporations could
easily trample employee or consumer rights that are uneconomical to
pursue alone.297
Second, outside funding increases competition among the plaintiffs’ bar in that it allows smaller or less established firms to litigate
cases they might not otherwise be able to afford.298 Competition could
foster innovation and creativity and drive down transaction costs for
plaintiffs. And because financiers want well-credentialed attorneys
handling the cases they fund, their vetting process also helps screen
out unqualified lawyers.
296

See supra Parts III.A.1 and III.A.3.
See Schanzenbach & Dana, supra note 166, at 10–16 (noting that third-party
financing could enhance deterrence for small claims).
298 Cf. supra note 287–89 and accompanying text.
297
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Third, financiers may improve the correlation between settlement
value and the case’s merits.299 When one-time, risk-averse plaintiffs
follow their attorney’s advice, and that advice is animated by attorney
self-interest or collusion with the defendant, the settlement value may
not reflect the lawsuit’s merits. Permitting a financier to assume financial risks diminishes this possibility: Attorneys can genuinely advise
clients about the costs and benefits of a proceeding and make realistic
settlement demands. Finally, as repeat players, financiers are likely to
be more efficient than one-time clients at monitoring litigation costs
and keeping attorneys’ fees manageable.300
These benefits do not come without costs. Absent a judge’s
ability to assess the financing agreement’s fairness and a claimant’s
capacity to air allegations of collusion between the financier and
attorney in a judicial—as opposed to arbitral—forum, the potential
for overreaching exists. And while alternative financing may frequently alleviate the access-to-justice problem by shifting the risk of
loss to the financier, it also further commodifies legal claims. Of
course, contingent-fee plaintiffs’ attorneys have long been monetizing
claims, often regardless of their clients’ stated aims, which suggests
that the status quo may not change with greater use of third-party
financing.301 Either way, law firms have few incentives to take cases
like employment-discrimination and civil-rights claims where injunctive and declaratory relief is a nontrivial component. One recent
empirical study showed that seventy-five percent of civil-rights,
twenty-nine percent of labor-and-employment, thirty-seven percent of
consumer, and thirty-four percent of employee-benefits class settlements included some injunctive or declaratory relief.302 While feeshifting statutes help by shifting litigation costs to the defendant, these
statutes award fees to a prevailing plaintiff at the end of the lawsuit.
This does nothing to alleviate concerns about the increased costs of
initiating aggregate litigation, such as higher administrative
expenses.303
This commodification conundrum creates two potential, interrelated problems: underenforcement of social-change and publicinterest litigation, and inaccessibility of indivisible remedies. Public299

See Molot, supra note 18, at 101.
See id. at 112–13; see also Hylton, supra note 18, at 27.
301 See Relis, supra note 169, at 378–79.
302 Fitzpatrick, supra note 69, at 824 tbl.3 (studying class action settlements from 2006
and 2007). Injunctive or declaratory relief included “modification of terms of employee
benefit plans, modification of compensation practices, changes in business practices, capital
improvements, research, and unliquidated repairs to property.” Id.
303 See supra Part I.A.1 and I.A.2 (discussing the increased costs of aggregate litigation).
300
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interest and social-change litigation have no hard-edged definitions,
but include claims like race and sex discrimination in the workplace,304 sexual harassment,305 Fair Debt Collection Practices Act306
violations, housing desegregation or discrimination suits,307
Americans with Disabilities Act308 violations, and even toxic torts
requiring environmental cleanup.309 Each of these types of claims
includes a hybrid of divisible and indivisible relief. Take Title VII, for
example: Were funders to invest in Title VII litigation for a percentage of the plaintiffs’ recovery, they would care mainly about compensatory damages, punitive damages, and back pay—not injunctive
or declaratory relief, even though Congress first enacted Title VII
with those social change goals in mind.310
Still, the availability of compensatory and punitive damages
might spur funders to bankroll aggregated cases that might otherwise
be ignored. Financiers would invest for the profit, but since attorneys
must bring all available claims on behalf of their clients and pursue
their clients’ wishes as part of their duty of loyalty, they would request
injunctive or declaratory relief as well. And because clients retain ultimate control over settlement decisions,311 there is less danger that
attorneys might trade meaningful reforms for compensation against
the clients’ wishes.
Another option would be for judges to allow financiers to receive
a percentage of the group’s recovery under the fee-shifting statutes
just as they would an attorney. If indivisible relief is a major remedial
component, then courts could still use the fee-shifting statute to determine a base amount and then factor in a higher multiplier based on
304 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(a)–(b); see, e.g., Davis v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co. Consol., 516
F.3d 955, 965 (11th Cir. 2008).
305 See, e.g., Bremiller v. Cleveland Psychiatric Inst., 195 F.R.D. 1, 25 (N.D. Ohio 2000)
(noting the availability of injunctive relief for sexual harassment).
306 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692-1692p (2006).
307 See, e.g., United States v. Matusoff Rental Co., 494 F. Supp. 2d 740, 746–47 (S.D.
Ohio 2007) (noting the availability of injunctive relief under the Fair Housing Act).
308 42 U.S.C. § 12101 (2006).
309 See, e.g., 33 U.S.C. § 1319(b) (authorizing injunctive relief for the violation of federal
water pollution standards)).
310 Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 417–18 (1975) (noting that Congress’s
primary objective in passing Title VII was prophylactic and intended to add backpay to the
availability of injunctive relief); cf. THE RIGHT HONOURABLE LORD JUSTICE JACKSON,
REVIEW OF CIVIL LITIGATION COSTS: FINAL REPORT 118 (2009), available at http://www.
judiciary.gov.uk/NR/rdonlyres/8EB9F3F3-9C4A-4139-8A93-56F09672EB6A/0/jacksonfinal
report140110.pdf (“Third party funding is not usually feasible where non-monetary relief,
such as an injunction or declaration, is the main remedy sought.”).
311 See supra Part III.B (discussing decision-making control).
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the litigation’s “undesirability” and the results obtained.312
Alternatively, if funders loaned money directly to law firms, as
Counsel Financial did in funding Napoli Bern’s Ground Zero workers’
claims, then courts might consider whether it is appropriate to pass
interest charges on to the defendant as part of a fee-shifting regime.313
In this way, judges can fulfill the legislative intent behind fee-shifting
statutes and ensure that social-change litigation and remedies that
seek accountability through declaratory and injunctive relief are not
casualties of third-party financing.
CONCLUSION
Alternative litigation financing, if properly engineered, could
help alleviate the financial pressure on the attorney-client relationship
and thereby encourage ethical behavior in pursuing and settling aggregate litigation. Presently, attorneys who specialize in large-scale litigation bear the burden of funding it—a practice that prevents lawyers
with less capital from entering the field and tempts those who do fund
litigation to protect their own financial interests by betraying their
duties to their clients. If financial risk is no longer an integral part of
an attorney’s relationship with her clients, several new possibilities
arise. First, financiers might bankroll talented attorneys who could not
otherwise afford to initiate aggregate litigation. Second, new entrants
could intensify competition among the plaintiffs’ bar that could
encourage innovation and drive down fees. Finally, given the
increased costs and risks associated with multidistrict litigation as
opposed to class actions, allowing financiers to enter the picture
ensures that meritorious, large-scale suits will not wither alongside the
class action. To be sure, adding an intermediary can introduce competing incentives and is thus not a cure-all for every principal-agent
problem. But third-party financiers offer a promising means with
which to manage some of these problems in aggregate litigation.
312 Courts typically consider some or all of the following factors when determining a
lodestar amount: (1) the time and labor involved; (2) the novelty and difficulty of the questions; (3) the skill required; (4) preclusion of other employment by the attorney; (5) the
customary fee; (6) whether the fee is fixed or contingent; (7) time limitations imposed by
the client or by circumstance; (8) the amount involved and the results obtained; (9) the
experience, reputation, and ability of the attorneys; (10) the undesirability of the case; (11)
the nature and length of the lawyer-client relationship; and (12) awards in similar cases.
E.g., Johnson v. Ga. Hwy. Express Inc., 488 F.2d 714, 717–19 (5th Cir. 1974).
313 Judge Hellerstein forbade attorneys from passing the litigation financing’s interest
costs on to their clients in the Ground Zero workers litigation. Mireya Navarro, Judge
Rejects Legal Fees in 9/11 Settlement, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 28, 2010, at A17. Given that he
cited fairness grounds, this may not be a barrier in fee-shifting litigation, since the idea
behind fee-shifting statutes is that plaintiffs would not have to incur attorneys’ fees at all
but for the defendant’s wrongdoing.

